LEGAL CONCEPTS IN CASES OF EMINENT DOMAIN by CORMACK, JOSEPH M.
LEGAL CONCEPTS IN CASES OF EMINENT T
DOMAIN
JOSEPH M. CORMIACK 0
THERE is nothing original in a suggestion that in legal thinldng
mental concepts should be used instead of physical. Possibly
the best-known exposition of the thought is that of the late
Wesley N. Hofeld.1 He expresses it as a matter of "differentiat-
ing purely legal relations from the physical and mental facts that
call such relations into being." He gives as reasons for the tend-
ency to confuse and blend the two types of concepts, association
of ideas and defective terminology. Professor Hobfeld's sug-
gested system of terminology 2 is designed to differentiate legal
relations from all others.
Possibly there is something original in a laboratory study of
certain of the materials of legal science in order to observe the
workings of the two types of concepts in the actual solution of
problems. It is with this thought in mind that the field of emi-
nent domain is selected for investigation.
The principle underlying the law of eminent domain has be-
come crystallized in the form of expression set forth in the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution: ".... nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion." The words "property" and "take", to which detailed con-
sideration will be given, have thus been encysted in the heart
of this branch of the law.
The principle of the juristic necessity of compensation to an
individual whose property is taken for public use, has been one.
of the most universally recognized principles of justice.3 It is
*Professor of Law, University of Southern California; author of The
Legal Tender Cases-A Drama of American Legal and Finandal History
(1929) 16 VA. L. REv. 132; The Universal Draft and Constitutional Linita-
tions (1930) 3 So. CALIF. L. Rnv. 361.
,. HoHFEL, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS As APPLIED IN JUDICIAL
REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS (1923) 27; reprinted from (1913)
23 YALE L. J. 16, at 20. Cf. Bingham, The Nature and Importabnce of
Legal Possession (1915) 13 MIciH. L. REV. 535.
2 HOHFELD, op. cit. supra note 1, at 65; reprinted from (1917) 26 YALE
L. J. 710. His suggestions as to terminology are not followed at all points
in this article.
3 Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Emineit Donzain,
(1931) 6 Wis. L. REv. 67.
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found in the Roman law,4 the Code Napoleon," and in the legal
systems of the American colonies.6 The expression eminens do-
minium, with which the principle is now associated, seems first
to have been used by Grotius, in 1625. 7 Provisions such as the
quoted portion of the Fifth Amendment have now been adopted
in the constitutions of all the states, save one., In that state,
North Carolina, the principle of Magna Chartc that no person
ought to be deprived of his life, liberty, or property but by the
law of the land,9 has been included in the constitution,0 and the
same result has been reached through judicial interpretation of
that provision." In instances where, in the past, applicable con-
stitutional provisions have been lacking, courts have nevertheless
held invalid legislative acts not recognizing the principle.12 In
addition, the requirement has been imposed upon the states by
the "due process of law" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The word "property" is used by Hohfeld as an example of de-
fective terminology. He says:
"Both with lawyers and with laymen this term has no definite
or stable connotation. Sometimes it is employed to indicate the
physical object to which various legal rights, privileges, etc., re-
late; then again-with far greater discrimination and accuracy
4 Matthews, The Valuation of Property in The Roman Law (1921), 34
HARv. L. R. 227, 252.
5 Bk. II, tit. 2, art. 545.
6 1 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN (2nd ed. 1917) 13, 22. As to the de-
velopment of the principle in England, consult ibid. 6.
7 DE JURE BELLI AC PA6IS, lib. iii, c. 20.
8 The history of the adoption of the constitutional provisions is outlined
in 1 Lnwis, EMINENT DOMAIN (3d ed. 1909) 20.
9 MAGNA CHARTA, cap. 39, is rendered in STUBBS, SELECT CHARTERS (0th
ed. 1921) 297, following one of the Cottonian manuscripts (Cotton MIS.,
Aug. ii 36): "Nullus liber homo capiatur, vel imprisonetur, aut dissaisla-
tur, aut utlagetur, aut exuletur, aut aliquo modo destruatur, nee super ourm
ibimus, nee super eum mittemus, nisi per legale judicium parium suorum
vel per legem terrae." The passage is translated in POUND, READINGS ON
-THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMON LAW (2nd ed. 1913) 147: "No
freeman shall be taken, or imprisoied, or be disseised of his freehold, or
liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise de-
stroyed, nor will we pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful judg-
ment of his peers, or by the law of the land."
10 N. C. CONST., art. 1, § 17: "No person ought to be taken, imprisoned,
or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed or exiled,
or in any manner deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the law
of the land."
1 Staten v. Norfolk & Carolina R.R., 111 N. C. 278, 16 S. E. 181, (1802);
cf. Johnston v. Rankin, 70 N. C. 550 (1874); Phillips v. Postal Tel. Cable
Co., 130 N. C. 513, 41 S. E. 1022 (1902).
12 Grant, op. cit. supra note 3, at 71.
13 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 17 Sup.
Ct. 581 (1897). See Grant, The Natural Law Background of Due Process
(1931) 31 COL. L. REV. 56, 71, 79.
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-the word is used to denote the legal interest (or aggregate of
legal relations) appertaining to such physical object. Frequently
there is a rapid and fallacious shift from the one meaning to the
other. At times, also, the term is used in such a 'blended' sense
as to convey no definite meaning whatever." 1
The usage first referred to may be described as the use of a
physical concept, the latter of a mental. The one may be de-
scribed as a concept of property as consisting of tangible phy-
sical objects, with which certain human beings are more or less
intimately connected; the other as a concept of property as con-
sisting of legal relations between human beings, some of which
relations to a greater or less degree involve control over certain
physical objects. In the use of the former concept the lawyer's
mind is directed primarily toward things, in the latter toward
human beings. The one deals with material substances, the
other with abstract conceptions. The one is objective, the other
subjective.
A difficulty in connection with the use of the physical concept
has been thus expressed by Mr. Justice Holmes: "The fact
that tangible property is also visible tends to give a rigidity to
our conception of our rights in it that we do not attach to others
less concretely clothed." 15 It is worthy of note that the viewpoint
of the Roman (and, therefore, of the civil) law seems to favor
the use of the mental concept of property. Thus in the Digest
we find the title De Adqzrendo Rerma Dominzio.' The refer-
ence is to the acquiring of ownership of things, and not to the
acquiring of things as such 1 7  The word propriet.s in Roman
law never means a material thing, but a legal position in regard
to it; the thing itself is nwteria.18
"Take" is a term much like "transfer," which is used by
Hohfeld as an illustration of the difficulty, as regards legal ter-
14 HOHFELD, op. cit. supra note 1, at 28. Compare Bowen, Th Concept
of Private Property (1925) 11 CoRN. L. Q. 41. But see Costigan, A Pb a
for a Modern Definition and Cla-ssification of Real Property (1903) 12
YALE L. J. 425.
15 Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 155, 41 Sup. Ct. 458, 459 (1921). He
has beautifully described the variable quality of a word, as follows: "A
word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living
thought, and may vary greatly in color and content according to the cir-
cumstances and the time in which it is used." Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S.
418, 425, 38 Sup. Ct. 158, 159 (1918).
16 DIG. 41.1.9.6.
17 While Buckland provisionally calls domnbihno ownership, he feels that
this is a little misleading, and prefers to consider dondninum "the ultimate
right to the thing." BUCKLAND, A BIANUAL OF ROMIAN PRIVATE LAW (1925)
110, 112. Res, like our "property", is sometimes used in a physical, and
sometimes in a mental, sense. Ibid. 107.
'ISIACLEOD, ELEMENTS OF ECONOMICS (1881) 143.
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minology, that many of the words used were originally applicable
only to physical things. 9 He points out that the use of such
terms in connection with legal relations is, strictly speaking,
figurative or fictional, and essentially metaphorical. Confusion
and blurring of ideas are easy results of such a condition.
To take, from the standpoint of the physical meaning of the
word, means to acquire custody. The gist of the other, or mental,
usage possible in regard to the meaning of taking is placed by
Shakespeare in the mouth of Shylock. After the judgment of
the court the merchant of Venice says:
"You take my house when you do take the prop
"That doth sustain my house; you take my life
"When you do take the means whereby I live." 20
The prominent position of the work "take" in the American
law of eminent domain is fortuitous, but its influence has not
been thereby lessened. While the words "take" and "property"
cannot be dissociated in the present connection, the problem in
regard to choice of concepts is the same in regard to both.
A choice, in eminent domain cases, between the concepts which
have been discussed involves important consequences. Under
the physical concept it is necessary, in order that compensation
to the condemnee be required, that he be deprived of the posses-
sion of land or some other tangible physical object. Under the
mental concept, it is only necessary that there be interference
with some of the legal relations which, from the standpoint of
this concept, constitute his property.
21
The two leading writers in the field of eminent domain dis-
agree as to which of the concepts should be used. Nichols "
approves the former, and Lewis 23 the latter. Nichols supports
the physical concept largely upon the ground of adherence to
precedent, and the use of the word "taken" in constitutional
provisions. Lewis supports the legal relations concept by quot-
ing the language of decisions which will be discussed in this
article.
It is the purpose of eminent domain proceedings to distribute
throughout the community the loss inflicted upon the individual
by the making of public improvements. In the light of this
public policy, the ideal to be aimed at is that the compensation
awarded shall put the injured party in as good condition as he
would have been in if the condemnation proceedings had not
19 HoHFELD, op. cit. supra note 1, at 30.
2 0 THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, act. 4, se. 1, 1. 375.
21 Notice will be taken later of the practical difficulties which render
impossible compensation because of every such interference.
22 1 NICHOLS, op. cit. sgupra note 6, at 299.
23 1 LEwis, op. cit. supra note 8, at 62.
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occurred. 24 Nothing short of this is adequate compensationY.
The law of eminent domain is merely one method of approach
to the problems of the law of damages. As Mr. Justice Holmes
has well expressed it, a constitution deals "with persons, not with
tracts of land."6 Either a physical or a legal relations concep-
tion of the process is simply a tool for the use of the legal
profession in adjusting the relations of human beings. A choice
between the conceptions must be made upon considerations of
comparative usefulness for purposes of legal thinking in ma-
ing such adjustments.
Any concept is adequate if it produces proper results for the
.purpose at hand,2 7 and during the early development of the law
of this country a purely physical conception of the process of
condemnation was amply sufficient. In Colonial times there
was little necessity for the use of eminent domain procedure.
There were no roads, nearly all land was unsettled and unim-
proved, and much had not been even allotted to private owner-
ship. While the "marginal" land of the economists surrounded
all land which was used, land in small strips had no appreciable
value. When a road was constructed, it simply traversed the
surface of the land, without cuts or fills, and there were no
locomotives to belch forth sparks and fumes, or pipes to be laid
for public utilities.2' Whenever there was any occasion for the
institution of eminent domain proceedings, the land was "taken"
in every sense of the word.2 Under these conditions, the plysi-
cal concept of the taking of property for public use developed.
Its use was later encouraged by the adoption of constitutional
provisions containing the words "take" and "property," with
their physical connotations. The concept thus obtained a strong
hold upon the courts, so that Sedgwick, writing in 1857, stated
the law as follows:
"It seems to be settled that, to entitle the oumer to protection
. . . the property must be actually taken in the physical sense
24 See Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U. S. 299, 304, 43
Sup. Ct. 354, 356 (1923).
2 This method of expression is borrowed from Mr. Justice Campbell, in
Grand Rapids & Ind. R.R. v. Heisel, 47 Mlich. 393, 398, 11 N. W. 212, 215
(1882). It is obvious that practical difficulties of administration make
impossible anything more than approach to attainment of the ideal sug-
gested.
26 Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 217 U. S. 189, 195,
30 Sup. Ct. 459, 460 (1910).
27 The writer is indebted to oral statements of Professor Walter Wheeler
Cook for this thought.
2S I NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 6, at 14.
2 Statutes providing for the necessities of mills "were treated merely
as a regulation of the conflicting rights of the different riparian owners
in the stream." Ibid. 20.
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of the word, and that the proprietor is not entitled to claim
remuneration for indirect or consequential damage, no matter
how serious or how clearly and unquestionably resulting from
the exercise of the power of eminent domain. This rule has been
repeatedly declared in many of the States of the Union." "
After discussing the decisions, Sedgwick criticized this atti-
tude on the part of the courts:
"To differ from the voice of so many learned and sagacious
magistrates, may almost wear the aspect of presumption; but
I cannot refrain from the expression of the opinion, that this
limitation of the term taking to the actual physical appropria-
tion of property or a divesting of the title is, it seems to me, far
too narrow a construction to answer the purposes of justice,
or to meet the demands of an equal administration of the great
powers of government." "I
In 1823 it was said, in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts, in discussing the applicable provision of the constitu-
tion of that state, that it had "ever been confined, in judicial
application, to the case of property actually taken and appro-
priated by the government." 32
Mr. Chief Justice John B. Gibson, the great builder of the
law of Pennsylvania,33 advanced the novel contention that it was
necessary to leave some elements of compensation outside the
protection of the Constitution, in order to prevent excessive
awards.34 In connection with early eminent domain proceedings,
the courts were so impressed with the drastic nature of the
expedient, in its effect upon the individual, that they were in.
clined to favor him in the matter of compensation. As the im-
portance of public improvements in the development of the
country became more manifest, this feeling disappeared. The
sympathies of the courts then tended to be with those initiating
such enterprises.
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of the use of a phy-
sical conception in this connection was made by Mr. Chief Justice
- Gibson in 1843, in Monongahela Navigation Company v. Coons."
It was held that the plaintiff was not entitled to compensation
because of the flooding of his mill as a result of obstruction of
the stream. The learned justice said:
30 SEDGWICK, STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1857) 519.
31 Ibid. 524.
32 Mr. Chief Justice Parker, in Callender v. Marsh, 1 Pick. (18 Mass.)
418, 430 (1823).
33 See excellent biographical sketch in MATLACK, 3 GREAT AMERICAN
LAWYERS (1908) 353.
34 Philadelphia and Trenton R.R., 6 Whart. 25, 46 (Pa. 1840).
35 6 Watts & S. 101 (Pa. 1843).
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"Now, it cannot be said that the plaintiff's mill was taken or
applied, in any legitimate sense, by the State, or by the company
invested with its power; nor can it be said he was deprived of
it.... It is true, that a nuisance by flooding a man's land was
originally considered so far a species of ouster, that he might
have had remedy for it by assize of novel disseisin, or assize
of nuisance, at his election; but we are not to suppose that the
framers of the Constitution meant to entangle their meaning in
the mazes of the jus a.ntiqzumn. It was aptly said by Chief Jus-
tice Tilghman, in The Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank v. Smith,
(3 Serg. & Rawle 69), that conventions to regulate the conduct
of nations are not to be interpreted like articles of agreement
at the common law; and that where multitudes are to be affected
by the construction of an instrument, great regard should be paid
to the spirit and intention. And the reason for it is an obvious
one. A constitution is made, not particularly for the inspection
of lawyers, but for the inspection of the million, that they may
read and discern in it their rights and their duties; and it is
consequently expressed in the terms that are most familiar to
them. Words, therefore, whi~h do not of themselves denote that
they are used in a technical sense, are to have their plain, popu-
lar, obvious, and natural meaning; and, applying this rule to
the context of the Constitution, we have no difficulty in saying
that the State is not bound beyond her will to pay for property
which she has not taken to herself for the public use." 20
The learned justice's assumption as to the understanding of
laymen seems correct, as applied to the word "take", which the
layman has occasion to use only in a physical sense. As to the
word "property", however, it seems proper to ask whether lay-
men, as well as lawyers, do not use it when they desire to have
a general term covering every element of an individual's finan-
cial well-being. Is not the layman's thought represented by
the following statement: "These terms, 'life,' 'liberty,' and
'property,' are representative terms and cover every right to
which a member of the body politic is entitled under the law." '
It is a remarkable coincidence that in the same opinion, in
the Monongahela case, Mr. Chief Justice Gibson should give
what is probably the most vivid judicial recognition of the
practical injustice resulting from the use of a physical concept
in eminent domain cases:
"It is not, therefore, enough to set before us a case of moral
wrong, without showing us that we have legal power to redress
it. Beyond constitutional restraint or legislative power, there
is none but the legislative will, tempered by its sense of justice,
3c Ibid. 113.
37 Sherwood, J., in State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 163, 172, 31 S. W. 781, 732
(1895). Identical language, except as to the first word, is to be found in




which has happily been sufficient, in most cases, to protect the
citizen. Compensation has been provided for every injury which
could be foreseen, whether within the constitutional injunction
or not, in all laws for public works by the State or a corpora-
tion; though cases of damage have occurred which could neither
be anticipated or brought within the benefit of the provision
by the most strained construction. In one instance, a profitable
ferry on the Susquehanna, at its confluence with the Juniata,
was destroyed by the Pennsylvania Canal; and, in another, an
invaluable spring of water, at the margin of the river, near
Selinsgrove, was drowned. These losses, like casualties in the
prosecution of every public work, are accidental, but unavoid-
able; and they are but samples of a multitude of others; so
that the plaintiffs have at least the miserable good luck to know
that they have companions in misfortune: would that it were
in our power to afford them more solid consolation!" 18
He also wrote the opinion denying compensation in a situation
where, as he stated the facts, lowering the grade of a street
had left the plaintiff's church building worthless, and had left the
ground on which it stood worth no more than the expense of
sinking the surface to the common level.- He said that the
legislature had "never dreamt that it was laying the foundation
of such injustice," but held that it was unavoidable.
4
In an early decision denying compensation in a situation where
the plaintiff had sustained loss through the erection of a rail-
road in the street by his land, it was said:
"The prohibition of the constitution is against taking private
property without compensation, and not against injuries to such
property, where it is not taken. In this case, the private property
of the plaintiffs is not taken by the defendants; but the whole
allegation is, that it is injured by erections in its vicinity; and
the plaintiffs have not, therefore, any claim to have their dam-
ages ascertained and paid for before such erections shall be
constructed or used." 41
It was stated, in an early Maine decision, 42 that the records of
judicial proceedings showed that private property in railroads,
turnpike roads, toll bridges, and ferry ways had been often
greatly injured, and sometimes quite destroyed, by acts author-
ized by legislation, which, according to judicial decisions, did
3s Supra note 35, at 115.
39 O'Connor v. Pittsburgh, 6 Harris (18 Pa. St.) 187 (1851).
40 Ibid. 190. See also Sharpless v. Philadelphia, 9 Harris (21 Pa. St.)
147, 166 (1853).
4-1 Mr. Justice Edmonds, in Drake v. Hudson River R. Co., 7 Barb. 508,
559 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1849).
42 Cushman v. Smith, 34 Me. 247, 257 (1852).
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not violate any constitutional provision. 3 To take a man's land
for public use was defined as "to deprive him of his title to it,
or of some part of his title, so that the entire dominion over
it no longer remains with him." ,
The fact that the public only acquires a revertible easement
in a highway was used, in an early case,1 to justify a refusal
of compensation 0 when land was condemned for such a purpose.
It was said that in order to come within the constitution there
"should be such a taking as divests the owner of all title to or
control over the property taken, and is an unqualified appropria-
tion of it to the public." 47
The physical conception of the eminent domain process made
use of the word "property", as well as "take". Thus, in denying
compensation when a riparian owner complained of loss of the
benefits of navigation, it was said:
"What must be understood by the term, private property in
the contemplation of the constitution?
"It appears to us that it applies to such property as belongs
absolutely to an individual, and of which he has the exclusive
right of disposition; property of a specific, fixed, and tangible
nature, capable of being had in possession and transmitted to
another, as houses, lands, and chattels." -5
43 Ibid. 257.
44Ibid. 260. Mr. Chief Justice Shepley also said, as dicta: "The (consti-
tutional) provision was not designed, and it cannot operate to prevent
legislation, which should authorize acts, operating directly and injuriously,
as well as indirectly upon private property, when no attempt is made to
appropriate it to public use....
"The design appears to have been simply to declare, that private prop -
erty shall not be changed to public property, or transferred from the
owner to others, for public use, without compensation; to prevent the per-
sonal property of individuals from being consumed or destroyed for public
use without compensation, not to protect such property from all injury by
the construction of public improvements; not to prevent its temporary
possession or use, without a destruction of it, or a change of its character."
lbid 258.
The following year the same court denied compensation in a case where
the plaintiff's mill had been damaged through diminution of the Ilow of
water because of the erection of a railroad embankment higher up the
stream. Mr. Chief Justice Shepley said: "No land, estate, or materials
owned by the plaintiff was taken; and he cannot be entitled to the remedy
provided by the statute in such cases." Rogers v. Kennebec & P. R.R., 35
Mle. 319, 323 (1853).
4 Livermore v. Town of Jamaica, 23 Vt. 361 (1851).
46 This is contrary to the settled position developed by the courts in
regard to easements. See note 110, infra.
4 7 Mr. Justice Kellogg, in Livermore v. Town of Jamaica, supra note 45,
at 365.
4 8 M r. Justice Handy, in Commissioners of Homochitto River v. W;ithers,
29 Miss. 21, 32 (1855). In this case the complainant owned a plantation
bordering upon a former bed of the Mississippi River, through which
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In another case it was held that it was not a taking of the
plaintiff's dwelling house for a railroad company to render it un-
fit for habitation by permitting cars loaded with offensive freight
to stand upon the tracks within ten feet of the house.4
In an interesting Wisconsin case, 0 later criticized in the same
court,51 it was held that the city of Milwaukee was not required
to make compensation, although it had caused a considerable
portion of the plaintiff's land to be washed away, with every
indication that the remainder would be destroyed. This result had
come about through the excavation by the city of a canal through
a strip of land which acted as a barrier between the plaintiff's
land and Lake Michigan, permitting the waves to rush through
with disastrous effect. It was reasoned that the case was not
within the constitutional provision, as the city "did not take the
property," but only "made a great public improvement in the
vicinity, which incidentally produced the injury complained
of." 52
enough water still flowed to keep it navigable. He alleged that a canal
was being dug which would prevent the water from flowing through the
old bed of the river, thus depriving him of the use of it as a navigable
body of water. A general demurrer was sustained, upon the ground of
freedom of the government from responsibility for the consequences of
acts done to improve navigation. Following the quotation in the text, it
was reasoned that the complainant's property in the water which flowed
through the old bed of the river was subject to this limitation. See also
In the Matter of Dorrance-Street, 4 R. I. 230, 245 (1856).
49 Beseman v. Pennsylvania R.R., 50 N. J. L. 235, 13 Atl. 164 (1888).
zo Alexander v. City of Milwaukee, 16 Wis. 247 (1862).
-' In Pettigrew v. Evansville, 25 Wis. 223, 227 (1870), it was held that
the defendant village could not, without paying compensation, drain the
waters of a natural reservoir so as to cause them to go upon the plaintiff's
land. The Alexander case was distinguished upon the ground that there
the injury to the property of the plaintiff was remote and consequential,
as it came about only through the blowing of the wind in a particular di-
rection. The distinction is so weak as to imply a criticism.
In Arimond v. Green Bay and Mississippi Canal Co., 31 Wis. 310, 335
(1872), it was held that compensation must be made whore a lake was
raised by a dam so as to submerge the plaintiff's land. Mr. Chief Justice
Dixon admitted doubt as to the correctness of the decision in the Ale:-
ander case. He stated that "it was an extreme application of the doctrine
of damnum absque injuria, and that the principle of it is not to be ex-
tended to other and dissimilar cases, or to a case like the present." The
Arimond case involved the same dam as the leading case of Pumpelly v.
Green Bay Company, infra note 62.
-Alexander v. City of Milwaukee, supra note 50, at 253. It was algo
reasoned that even though the injuries could not be classed as remote and
speculative, nevertheless the city was not liable, upon the ground of gov-
ernmental freedom from responsibility in doing work for the public benefit,
Mr. JIistice Paine concurred, at 257, upon the ground of adherence to
precedent. He pointed out, however, that even though the case was not
-within the letter of the constitutional provision, with which he agreed, in
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It was held that there was no taking of land for any purpose
under an ordinance which permitted an adjoining proprietor to
erect a party wall across the line of his neighbor's land without
consent, and which compelled the latter to pay half the cost
of any portion of the wall which he later used. It was reasoned
that the land was not taken from the owner in any sense, as
it remained his, together with the wall constructed upon it. He
was simply required to pay part of the cost of the wall in case
he used it.3
The obvious failure of such cases to award compensation for
serious losses, and the consequent failure to accomplish the social
purpose of eminent domain proceedings, were bound to produce
a revolt against the use of a physical conception of the process.
A change in methods of thought was first evidenced by judicial
recognition that, in cases of so-called destruction, i.e., cases
where continued use of land had been made impossible, there
had been, for legal purposes, a taking of property. The practical
futility of the distinction between taking and damaging was
there most apparent. Any holding that a destruction of property
constitutes a taking of it is a departure from a strictly physical
conception of taking. In the physical acceptation of the term,
there must be an appropriation by the taker from another. Mr.
Justice Brewer thus distinguished an earlier case, upon the
ground that it "was a case not of the taking, but of the destruc-
tion, of property." 5
his opinion it was entirely out of harmony with the spirit of the consti-
tutional provision to deny compensation.
53 Hunt v. Armbruster, 17 N. J. Eq. 208, 214 (1865). It was correctly
held that there was no public purpose involved.
541Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 338, 13
Sup. Ct. 622, 631 (1893). He was discussing, in the later case, the taking
of a franchise, for which it was held compensation must be made. In the
earlier ease which was distinguished, Bridge Co. v. United States, 105
U. S. 470 (1881), Congress had exercised a reserved power to withdraw
its consent to the construction of a bridge across a navigable river, after
construction had partially progressed. This was held to be a risk which
the company had voluntarily assumed when it chose to proceed under the
limited license which Congress had given, so that no compensation was
required. The results in both cases were correct, but the distinction
should have been put upon the different character of the legal relations
involved.
In Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 502, 510, 43 Sup.
Ct. 437, 438 (1923), M r. Justice Sutherland said: "If, under any power,
a contract or other property is taken for public use, the Government is
liable; but if injured or destroyed by lawful action, without a taking, the
Government is not liable." The refusal of compensation in this case was
proper, as the damage complained of was a legally remote consequence of
exercise of the war powers. The government had requisitioned the entire
production of steel plate of a certain plant for a year. This had made
impossible performance of a contract to deliver plate to the claimant. It
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The earliest cases treating a destruction as a taking were de-
cided prior to a number of the cases already discussed, and before
Sedgwick wrote. Perhaps the first case of the kind was Cren-
shaw v. Slate River Company,5 decided in Virginia in 1828. A
law had been passed compelling a mill owner to erect locks,
under the penalty of having his mill abated as a nuisance. With-
out citing any cases, and without referring to any authorities
other than Blackstone, it was held that eminent domain pro-
ceedings were necessary, Mr. Judge Carr saying:
"Here then, is a Law imposing upon the citizen a burthen,
which would render his property worthless, or destroying the
property in case he refuses to comply. The question forces
itself upon us: Can such a Law bind? That the eminent do-
main of the Sovereign Power, extends to the taking private
property for public purposes, I am free to admit. But then, to
render the exercise of this power lawful, a fair compensation
must always be made to the individual, under some equitable
assessment established by Law. This is laid down by the writers
on Natural Law, Civil, Common Law, and the Law of every
civilized country. . . I must declare it as my solemn conviction,
that whether we judge this Law by the principles of all Civilized
Governments, by the Federal Constitution, or that of our own
State, it is unconstitutional and void." 6
In a Mastachusetts case 5 decided four years later, tide water
had been permanently excluded from the plaintiff's land. It was
held that by this deprivation of the beneficial use of the land,
there had been, in a legal sense, a taking of it. In another case
the removal of the owner's dam which had protected a meadow
by keeping out salt water was held to constitute a taking of the
meadow 8
In a Massachusetts case 5 of the period of Rufus Choate, a
statute was involved which chartered a railroad and provided
that no other railroad should be authorized over its route within
a certain period. This was held to constitute a grant of an ex-
was also said, in regard to contracts: "Frustration and appropriation are
essentially different things." Ibid. 513, 43 Sup. Ct. at 439. Compensation
was awarded where the government through war-time requisition pre-
vented the petitioner from using water which it was entitled by convey-
ance and lease to divert from a canal owned by another. International
Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 399, 51 Sup. Ct. 176 (1931); see
(1931) 4 So. CALIF. RaV. 320.
55 6 Rand. 245 (Va. 1828).
S8 Ibid. 264. The other judges concurred in separate opinions.
57 Boston and Roxbury Mill Corporation v. Newman, 12 Pick. (29 Mass.)
467 (1832).
58 Glover v. Powell, 2 Stockt. (10 N. J. Eq.) 211 (1854).




clusive franchise which could not be violated without compensa-
tion. During the argument Choate and other counsel endeavored
to induce the court to think of all forms of property in strictly
physical terms. 0  In the opinion Mr. Chief Justice Shaw re-
fused to do this, attaching significance to the use in the MJassa-
chusetts Declaration of Rights of the term "appropriate", which,
he said, "is of the largest import and embraces every mode by
which property may be applied to the public use." C
One of the leading cases in the field of eminent domain is
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Cornpany,62 decided by the United States
Supreme Court in 1871. In this case compensation was awarded
because of the overflowing of land through the erection of a
dam for hydraulic purposes which raised the level of a lake.
In the opinion Mr. Justice Miller said, in a passage which has
been widely quoted in later cases:
"It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if in con-
struing a provision of constitutional law, always understood to
have been adopted for protection and security to the rights of
the individual as against-the government, and which has received
the commendation of jurists, statesmen, and commentators as
placing the just principles of the common law on that subject
beyond the power of ordinary legislation to change or control
them, it shall be held that if the government refrains from the
absolute conversion of real property to the uses of the public
it can destroy its value entirely, can inflict irreparable and per-
manent injury to any extent, can, in effect, subject it to total de-
struction without making any compensation, because, in the
narrowest sense of that word, it is not take= for the public use.
Such a construction would pervert the constitutional provision
into a restriction upon the rights of the citizen, as those rights
stood at the common law, instead of the government, and make
it an authority for invasion of private right under the pretext
of the public good, which had no warrant in the laws or prac-
tices of our ancestors." 63
This reasoning would seem to abandon the physical conception
of property entirely in eminent domain cases, but the opinion
limits the holding to cases "where real estate is actually invaded
by superinduced additions of water, earth, sand, or other ma-
terial or by having any artificial structure placed on it, so as to
effectually destroy or impair its usefulness." G4 Thus the physi-
cal concept is preserved to the extent of requiring a physieal
invasion of the land, and the case is distinguished by the same
6o Ibid. 25.
61 Ibid. 35.




court in a later case upon the ground that in it there was "a
physical invasion of the real estate of the private owner, and a
practical ouster of his possession." 11
The course of the later decisions of the United States Supreme
Court dealing with the overflow of land, is as follows: In Unitcd
States v. Lynah, in 1903,66 it was held that there had been a taking
of the petitioners' rice plantation when an overflow, resulting
from works in the improvement of navigation on the Savannah
River, had turned it into an irreclaimable bog. It was pointed out
that even in the improvement of navigation or the performance of
other public duties the government could not appropriate property
without being under the obligation imposed by the Fifth Amend-
ment to make compensation.6 7 As to the facts of the particular
case it was said: "While the government does not directly pro-
ceed to appropriate the title, yet it takes away the use and value;
when that is done it is of little consequence in whom the fee
may be vested." 6l As instances of cases where there had been
no taking, Mr. Justice Brewer distinguished a case in which
access to land abutting on a navigable river had been destroyed
by the construction of a pier on the submerged land in front of
the upland,69 and another in which a riparian proprietor had
been deprived of the use of her landing for the shipment of
products from her farm for the greater part of the gardening
season.0  A District Court case involving overflow from the
same improvements, but in which the injury could be remedied
at an alleged expense of $10,000, was distinguished upon the
ground that damage to such a limited extent constituted only
consequential injury.7 1 It was admitted that theoretically there
is no limit to what engineering skill might accomplish, but it was
made a "practical matter" of degree how far the damage would
have to go to constitute a taking.
7 2
65 Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. S. 635, 642 (1878). In this
case the plaintiff complained of obstruction of access to its lot during the
construction of a tunnel under the Chicago River. It was held that there
had been no taking of the plaintiff's property, that any work authorized
by law could not constitute a nuisance, and that the city was exempt from
liability in the proper performance of the work as the agent of the state
in the performance of a public function. It was pointed out that, unlil
the Pumpelly case, there had been no invasion of the plaintiff's lot, that
all that had been done was "to render for a time its use more incon-
venient." Ibid.
66 188 U. S. 445, 23 Sup. Ct. 349 (1903).
67 Ibid. 471, 23 Sup. Ct. at 357.
68 Ibid. 470, 23 Sup. Ct. at 357. It was held that when the compensa-
tion was paid the fee and the riparian rights passed to the government.
69 Ibid. 472, 23 Sup. Ct. at 357, discussing Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U. S.
141, 21 Sup. Ct. 48 (1900).
70 Ibid. 473, 23 Sup. Ct. at 358, discussing Gibson v. United States, IGO
U. S. 269, 17 Sup. Ct. 578 (1897).
71 Ibid. 473, 23 Sup. Ct. at 358, discussing Mills v. United States, 46
Fed. 738 (S. D. Ga. 1891).
72Ibid. 474, 23 Sup. Ct. at 358. Three members of the court dissented
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A year later, Bedford v. United Str.tvs - was decided. The
effect of revetments erected by the government for the improve-
ment of navigation had been to prevent the Mississippi River
from gradually lessening, through natural causes, the force of
the current directed against the claimants' land. A tract of 2300
acres was being eroded, and had been overflowed for a number
of years. The Puimpelly and Lyah cases were distinguished
upon the ground that in them there had been "an actual invasion
and appropriation of the land as distinguished from consequen-
tial damage." 74 The claimants were denied compensation, Mr.
Justice McKenna saying:
"In the case at bar the damage was strictly consequential.
It was the result of the action of the river through a course of
years. The case at bar, therefore, is distinguishable from the
Lyncwh case in the cause and manner of the injury. In the Lyzali
case the works were constructed in the bed of the river, ob-
structed the natural flow of its water, and were held to have
caused, as a direct consequence, the overflow of Lynah's planta-
tion. In the case at bar the works were constructed along the
banks of the river and their effect was to resist erosion of the
banks by the waters of the river. There was no other interfer-
ence with natural conditions. Therefore, the damage to appel-
lants' land, if it can be assigned to the works at all, was but an
incidental consequence of them." 71
The following year, in Mlanigault v. Springs,'- where an over-
flow t[o a "minor extent" was involved, it was again held that
there is no taking where the plaintiff is "merely put to some
extra expense." 7
upon the ground that there had been no overflowing, but only an inter-
ference with drainage, which constituted only consequential damage. It
was said in the dissenting opinion that if it were to be held that there
had been an overflowing, there still had been no taking of the property,
as the overflowing could have been stopped by raising the embanlknent
surrounding the plantation. Ib:d. 484, 23 Sup. Ct. at 302. Mr. Justice
McKenna did not participate in the decision.
73192 U. S. 217, 24 Sup. Ct. 23S (1904).
,4Ibid. 225, 24 Sup. CL. at 240.
75 Ibid. 224, 24 Sup. Ct. at 240.
76 199 U. S. 473, 26 Sup. Ct. 127 (1905).
7"Ibi& 484, 26 Sup. Ct. at 132. In Jackson v. United States, 230 U. S.
1, 33 Sup. Ct. 1011 (1913), it was held that it was not open to the peti-
tioners, who had built a levee to protect their own land, to claim that the
same land had been partially taken because the effect of the general system
of construction of levees along the Mississippi River was to keep water
from escaping from the river during high water periods, and thus to in-
crease the pressure against the petitioners' levee. It seems clear that this
decision represented sound social policy. Everyone along the river should
be required to engage in "team work" to curb the annual flood menace, and
there should be no complaint in regard to what others reasonably may
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In United States v. Cress, decided in 1917,18 it appeared that
land had been subjected to "a permanent liability to intermittent
but inevitably recurring overflows" through the construction of
locks and dams to iniprove navigation. It was argued that there
had been no taking of the land because it had been depreciated
in value only fifty per cent. Mr. Justice Pitney said, in reply
to this, that "it is the character of the invasion, not the amount
of damage resulting from it, so long as the damage is substantial,
that determines the question whether it is a taking." 71 It was
held that there had been a partial taking, for which compensation
must be made. The amount involved was comparatively small,""
and -the question whether the plaintiff could have prevented the
loss through protective engineering works was not discussed.
In another case it was held that where land was flooded by a
government irrigation reservoir there could be no recovery be-
cause of destruction of the business conducted upon the land, or
because of the enforced sale of cattle."' Mr. Justice McReynolds
assigned as the reason for this, that "there was no actual taking
of these things by the United States, and consequently no basis
for an implied promise to make compensation." 92
The latest pronouncement of the court upon the question is
that of Mr. Justice Sutherland, in 1924, that in order to con-
stitute a taking "it is, at least, necessary that the overflow be
the direct result of the structure, and constitute an actual, per-
manent invasion of the land, amounting to an appropriation of
and not merely an injury to the property." 83
If an attempt be made to reconcile these cases, it may be said
that the position of the United States Supreme Court is that
in order' that a flooding of land may constitute a taking, it is
necessary that the following requirements be satisfied: that the
physical facts involved be not too complicated ;84 that there be a
do in that regard. If it were desirable, it would not be feasible to dis-
tribute such losses.
78 243 U. S. 316, 37 Sup. Ct. 380 (1917).
9 Ibid. 328, 37 Sup. Ct. at 385.
so Fifty per cent of the value of the overflowed land was $495. In addi-
tion the plaintiff was held entitled to recover $500 because of the destruc-
tion of a ford, and the parties in a companion case covered by the opinion
were awarded $1500 because of the cutting off of the water power of a mill.
81 Bothwell v. United States, 254 U. S. 231, 41 Sup. Ct. 74 (1920).
82Ibid. 233, 41 Sup. Ct. at 75. To the same effect, Mitchell v. United
States, 267 U. S. 341, 45 Sup. Ct. 293 (1925) (not an overflow case).
83 Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U. S. 146, 149, 44 Sup. Ct. 264, 265
(1924). In this case the court felt that upon the facts the most that could
be said in favor of the claimant was that land which previously had been
subject to periodical overflows had probably been subjected to some in-
creased flooding.
84 Witness the quoted distinction between the Lynah and Bedford cases,
in the latter decision, supra note 75.
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permanent or intermittent physical invasion of the land; that the
loss substained be substantial, and not relate to a business con-
ducted upon the land; and that the situation be such that the
landowner cannot obviate the loss through protective engineer-
ing works with a reasonable expenditure of funds.,,
It was held, by the same court, that compensation is necessary
when a franchise is taken."" This is a recognition of intangibles,
but Mr. Justice Brewer, in a dictum, argues for the retention
of a strictly objective point of view in dealing with questions
relating to property under the Fifth Amendment. He bases
his contention upon the language used in the Constitutional pro-
vision:
"And this just compensation, it will be noticed, is for the
property, and not to the owner. Every other clause in this Fifth
Amendment is personal. 'No person shall be held to answer for
a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,' etc. Instead of continu-
ing that form of statement, and saying that no person shall be
deprived of his property without just compensation, the per-
sonal element is left out, and the 'just compensation' is to be a
full equivalent for the property taken." --
The cases which have been considered, recognizing a so-called
destruction as a taking, have gotten away from the most narrow
physical viewpoint, that, in order to constitute a taking, the pos-
session of land or other tangible objects must be removed from
the owner and appropriated by the taking authority. But un-
less a further advance is made, many cases of serious loss to
the individual will still remain uncompensated. The courts are
left in the position thus stated oracularly in a Maryland case:
"Every taking involves an injury of some kind, though every
injury does not include a taking." 88 And, while physical limita-
tions are retained in the methods of thought, a determination as
to which injuries are to be considered takings, and thus receive
compensation, will not be reached, as it should be, upon consider-
Mr. District Judge Grubb, after discussing the United States Supreme
Court flooding cases, reaches the following conclusion: "A fair construc-
tion of these decisions leads to the conclusion that, in order that a flooding
of lands may constitute a 'taking,' it must be not only a direct physical
invasion of private property, but must also act as an actual ouster and
cause a practical destruction of the value of the land." Coleman v. United
States, 181 Fed. 599, 603 (C. C. N. D. Ala. 1910). The cases are reviewed
in Walls v. United States, 44 Ct. Cl. 482 (1909), and Tompkins v. United
States, 45 Ct. Cl. 66 (1910).
s Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, supra note 54.
871bid. 326, 13 Sup. Ct. at 626. In addition to the franchise, tangible
property was taken.
88 Mr. Justice McSherry, in Garrett v. Lake Roland E. Ry., 79 Md. 277,
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ations having to do with the social policy of eminent domain
proceedings, or relating to practical expediency. The decision
will turn upon the accidental presence or absence, along the lines
already pointed out, of certain physical facts.
Th6 leading case taking another step, and treating the emi-
nent domain process as one of interference with valuable legal
relations, is Eatonv . B. C. & M. R. R.,81 decided by the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire in 1872, the year following the Pump-
elty decision. The facts involved were again those of overflow."0
The opinion was written by the learned Mr. Justice Jeremiah
Smith, later the distinguished professor of law at Harvard. The
opinion is as able as it is long, and is perhaps the best known
and most influential of those written by him." He said:
"The vital issue then is, whether the injuries complained of
amount to a taking of the plaintiff's property, within the consti-
tutional meaning of those terms. It might seem that to state
such a question is to answer it; but an examination of the au-
thorities reveals a decided conflict of opinion. The constitutional
prohibition (which exists in most, or all, of the States) has
received, ini some quarters, a construction which renders it of
comparatively little worth, being interpreted much as if it read,-
'No person shall be divested of the formal title to property with-
out compensation, but he may, without compensation, be deprived
of all that makes the title valuable.' To constitute a 'taking of
property', it seems to have sometimes been held necessary that
there.should be 'an exclusive appropriation', a 'total assumption
of possession', 'a complete ouster', an absolute or total conver-
tion of the entire property, a 'taking the property altogether'.
These views seem to us to be founded on a misconception of
the meaning of the term 'property', as used in the various State
constitutions." 92
He proceeds to point out that "in a strict legal sense, land is
not 'property,' but the subject of property;" that while the term
"property" is, in common parlance, frequently applied to a tract
of land or a chattel, in its legal signification it refers to legal
relations. Interference with those relations, he continues, takes
the owner's property.9 3 If the defendants were correct in thoir
282, 29 Atl. 830, 832 (1894).
89 51 N. H. 504 (1872).
"0 It was stated that at times the water carried sand, gravel, and stones
upon the plaintiff's land.
s9"In this masterly essay on the nature of property, the force of an un-
constitutional statute, and the meaning of a 'taking' by eminent domain,
Judge Smith established the law as it is generally held today upon an
impregnable basis." Beale, Jeremiah Smith (1921) 35 HAnv. L. REV. 1, 2.
92 Eaton v. B. C. & M. R.R., supra note 89, at 511.
93 He also reasoned that if the land itself were to be considered the prop.
erty, the practical result would be the same, as it would have to be inferred
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contention that they had a right to flood the plaintiff's land, they
would have an easement in it. But an easement is property, and
could have been acquired by the defendants only through sub-
fraction from the legal relations constituting the plaintiff's
property. This the constitution does not permit without compen-
sation. The plaintiff having received no compensation for the
easement,- it does not exist, and the plaintiff is entitled to his
damages95
The doctrine of the Eaton case was applied in another over-
flow case, in the same court, in an opinion written by Mr. Justice
Charles Doe, "one of the greatest of our American judges." , He
said:
"Property in land must be considered, for many purposes, not
as an absolute, unrestricted dominion, but as an aggregation of
qualified privileges, the limits of which are prescribed by the
equality of rights, and the correlation of rights and obligations
necessary for the highest enjoyment of land by the entire com-
munity of proprietors.... Property is taken, when any one of
those proprietary rights is taken, of which property consists." 07
Lewis quotes Mr. Justice Doe at length with approval.Y'
Nichols takes the opposite view1 He feels that it is "only by an
extremely technical argument" that the New Hampshire court is
able to interpret the word "take" as it does, and that this is not
a proper method of interpretation of the language of constitution
that the framers of the constitution intended to protect the essential ele-
ments of ownership which give the property value, and not to protect "mere
empty titles, or barren insignia of ownership." Ibid. 512. The damage
was said to be "consequential," in the sense of having occurred following
the lapse of a period of time after the defendants' acts, but was said to be
what Sir William Erle had called "consequential damage to the actionable
degree." Ibid. 513, citing Brand v. H. & C. Ry., L. PM 2 Q. B. 223, 249
(1867).
94It was held that eminent domain proceedings previously directed
against the plaintiff had related only to acts done by the defendants on the
plaintiff's land, whereas the overflowing now complained of resulted from
acts on the land of another. Ibid. 515.
95 The suit was an action on the case to recover damages for a taking
not covered by eminent domain proceedings. The New Hampshire consti-
tution contained no provision that private property should not be taken
for public use without compensation, but the learned justice thought of
the problem in those terms, and held that such a provision was to be im-
plied from the spirit and tenor of the whole instrument. Ibid. 510. There
was a provision that no part of a man's property should be taken from
him, or applied to public uses, without his consent. N. H. CONST. pt. 1,
art. 12.
'2 Beale, op. cit. supra note 91, at 2.
97 Thompson v. Androscoggin Co., 54 N. H. 545, 551 (1874).
9s 1 LEwis, op. cit. supra note 8, at 62.
00 1 NICHOLs, op. cit. supra note 6, at 293 ff.
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makers who used "an expression which, to the lay mind at least,
meant something wholly different." 'oo He states that the fallacy
of the argument of the New Hampshire court "lies in its as-
sumption that the property rights of an individual against other
individuals are the same as they are against the public." I'l He
contends that the constitutional provisions should be interpreted
in the light of the law as it existed prior to their adoption, and
therefore concludes that whatever one might think of the ab-
stract logic of the Eaton case, it came "too late to stand on its
merits as an interpretation of the constitution." 1",
Such a method of approach is to be criticized in that it is purely
legalistic. It gives no consideration to the requirements of the
social policy to be effected through eminent domain proceedings.
It affords no opportunity for an advancing civilization, con-
fronted with changing and more complicated conditions, to give
effect to the social policy set forth in certain words, by using a
more abstract conception in their interpretation than was re-
quired in early times. Processes of growth and development in
constitutional interpretation are utterly denied. The assumption
of the New Hampshire justices, that the property rights of an
individual against the public are the same as his rights against
other individuals, seems to be entirely justified, as applied to the
awardinglof compensation in eminent domain proceedings.103 It
is implicit in the nature of such proceedings that society desires
to purchase from an individual the property rights recognized in
him under a legal system designed to adjust his relations with
other individuals. The only difference that should exist between
a sale to society and one to an individual is that the former may
acquire property that the latter could not buy.
Before the Eaton case, Mr. Chief Justice Shaw of Massachu-
setts handed down the first decision holding that a railroad is
entitled to compensation when its line is crossed by a highway.
He said that if the public use of land or chattels deprived the
owner of possession or "some beneficial enjoyment," his property
had been "appropriated" to public use, and he was entitled to
compensation.104 In the leading case of City of St. Louis v. Hill,
100 Ibid. 299.
101 Ibid. 297.
"2 Ibid. 301. Although disagreeing with the Eaton case, he states that
the decision, "remarkable for its strength of logic and clearness of rea-
soning, attracted and retained the attention of the legal profession through-
out the country." Ibid. 296.
1of See note 189, infra.
104 Old Colony and Fall River R.R. v. County of Plymouth, 14 Gray (80
Mass.) 155, 161 (1859).
In 1874 the leading case of Grand Rapids Booming Company v. Jarvis
was decided by the Supreme Court of Michigan. This case involved facts
of overflow. In a famous passage Mr. Justice Christiancy asked: "Of
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a city ordinance imposing a building line restriction was held
invalid, because it constituted a taking of private property, even
though "title to the property and the right to use the same are
still in the defendant." 105
In a New Jersey case, Penimylvania R. R. v. Angcl, a similar
holding was made in dealing with a nuisance from the operation
of a railroad. Mr. Justice Dixon said, in a widely quoted passage:
"'Whether you flood the farmer's fields so that they cannot be
cultivated, or pollute the bleacher's stream so that his fabrics
are stained, or fill one's dwelling with smells and noise so that it
cannot be occupied in comfort, you equally take away the owner's
property." 08
In a similar case in the United States Supreme Court, Mr.
Justice Pitney said that while the legislature might legalize what
otherwise would be a public nuisance, it could not "confer im-
munity from action for a private nuisance of such a character
as to amount in effect to a taking of private property for public
use."'107 The same court held on demurrer that it would con-
stitute a taking of land for the government to install a battery
in a fort for the purpose of firing projectiles at will across the
area in time of peace.0 s
Title consists of an aggregate of valuable legal relations vested
in the person called the owner.'1 Throughout legal history it has
been the practice to treat as separate entities for legal and com-
mercial purposes certain sub-groups of legal relations included
within the aggregate known as title. Due to the methods of
thought thus historically developed, the courts have had no dif-
ficulty in recognizing as a taking of property any interference
with such a sub-group of legal relations. Here property has
always been looked at from a legal relations standpoint. This
applies to situations where easements 110 or profits a prc;2dre '
what does property practically consist, but of the incidents which the law
has recognized as attached to the title, or right of property? Is not the
idea of property in, or title to lands, apart from, and stripped of all its
incidents, a purely metaphysical abstraction, as immaterial and useless to
the owner as 'the stuff that dreams are made of'? Is it not a much less
injury to him, if it can injure him at all, to deprive him of this abstrac-
tion, than of the incidents of property, which alone render it practicably
valuable to him?" 30 Mich. 308, 320 (1374).
1( 116 Mo. 527, 22 S. W. 861 (1893).
.06 14 Stewart (14 N. J. Eq.) 316, 329 (1886).
107 Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U. S. 540, 553, 031 Sup. Ct.
654, 657 (1914).
108 Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U. S. 327,
43 Sup. Ct. 135 (1922).
10 1 HOHFEL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 162.
110 1 Lmwis, op. cit. supra note 8, at 428; 1 NiCHoLS. op. cit. supr7a note
6, at 346. As to violation of restrictions in deeds, see Note (1900) 19
CA~r. L. REv. 58.
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have been obstructed, or where in effect easements have been
imposed on land in favor of the public, as through building line 112
or zoning restrictions 113 (not justified under the police power), or
where there has been interference with riparian rights."' In an
oft-cited passage Mr. Justice Pitney stated that the right to
have water flow away from a mill dam unobstructed, except as
in the course of nature, "is not a mere easement or appurtenance,
but exists by the law of nature as an inseparable part of the
land." 111 Franchises, also, have been a historically recognized
species of property, and it has never been doubted that compen-
sation fs required whenever they are taken.,', There should be
no doubt in regard to other forms of contracts. 17
Licenses are not protected against obstruction by third parties, either
in eminent domain or other connections. 2 LEWIS, op. cit. supra note 8,
at 958; 1 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 6, at 340, 353; 2 TIFFANY, RFA
PROPERTY (2nd ed. 1920) 1202, 1391. For a criticism of the failure to
afford protection, see Note (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 642, discussing Taft v.
Bridgeton Worsted Co., 246 Mass. 444, 141 N. E. 119 (1923). Eminent
domain cases are: Clapp v. City of Boston, 133 Mass. 367 (1882); Elliott
v. Mason, 76 N. H. 229, 81 AtI. 701 (1911); Gorgas v. Philadelphia, H. &
P. Ry., 144 Pa. St. 1, 22 Atl. 715 (1891); Strickland v. Pennsylvania R.R,,
154 Pa. St. 348, 26 Atl. 431 (1893); Municipal Freehold Land Co. v. Met-
ropolitan and District Railways Joint Committee, 1 Cab. & E. 184 (Q. B.
1883); Bird v. Great Eastern Ry., 19 C. B. (N. S.) 268 (C. P. 1865) (not
"interest in land", under statute),; Frank Witrr & Co., Ltd. v. London
County Council, L. R. 1 K. B. 713 (1904) (not "interest in land", under
statute). Contra: Miller v. Greenwich, 33 Vr. (62 N. J. L.) 771, 42 Atl.
735 (1899). In Holt v. Gas Light and Coke Co., L. R. 7 Q. B. 728 (1872),
two tracts of land, not adjoining, had been used as a shooting range, by
reason of a license for hire to shoot over the intervening land. One of the
tracts was taken. It was held that the possibility of continuance of the
license should be taken into consideration in assessing the damages in re-
gard to the tract not taken, the statute permitting compensation when land
not taken was injuriously affected. The court did not feel that it wao
awarding compensation for the enforced discontinuance of the license as
such.
1 2 LEWIS, op. cit. supra note 8, at 957; 1 NICHOLS, op. Cit. Sli)a note
6, at 352.
112 1 LEwIS, 433; 1 NICHOLS, 280. As to height of buildings, see 1
LEWIS, 468; 1 NICHOLS, 277.
113 1 LEWIS, at 469; 1 NICHOLS, 278. As to other regulations, see I
LEWIS, 467 ff.; 1 NICHOLS, 271 ff.
114 1 LEWIS, 69 ff.; 1 NICHOLS, 404 ff. The police power as applied to
riparian rights is generally denominated the power to improve navigation.
The same thought has been expressed by saying that land held by indi-
vidual owners "is always subject to the servitude in respect of navigation
:reated in favor of the Federal government by the Constitution". Mr.
, hief Justice Fuller, in Gibson v. United States, supra note 70, at 272,
17 Sup. Ct. at 579.
'15 United States v. Cress, supra note 78, at 330, 37 Sup. Ct. at 386.
116 Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, supra note 54; 1 LEWIS,
107 if.; 1 NICHOLS, 68, 361 ff.
tt7Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U. S. 106, 44 Sup. Ct.
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It has sometimes been provided by statute, that if a city files
a plat indicating the location of future streets, no compensation
can be secured for buildings thereafter erected upon the land
thus claimed for street purposes. Under a physical conception
of property, the filing of such a plat does not constitute a taking
of the land. There has been no semblance of a physical invasion
or interference. From the standpoint of legal relations, however,
there has been a very serious change in the owner's position. It
was held in Pennsylvania that under such circumstances there
was no taldng.118  The position of the doctrine has been greatly
weakened in that state,113 and in other jurisdictions there has
been agreement that such action constitutes a taldng of
471 (1924); Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U. S. 4S1, 51
Sup. Ct. 229 (1931); (1931) 4 So. CALIF. REV. 320; 2 LEwis, 745; 1
NIcHOLS, 68. In McGrath v. Boston, 103 Mass. 369 (1869), the plaintiff
occupied certain land under a written instrument which the court inter-
preted to be an executory contract with the owner of the fee, and not a
lease. The defendant city gave notice of intention to take a part of the
premises. SLx months later, during the period covered by the contract, a
new owner of the fee, to whom it had been conveyed by the one with whom
the plaintiff had his contract, gave the plaintiff notice to quit, and removed
the plaintiff's furniture. The court states that the plaintiff then moved
out. The city did not enter until over nine months after the plaintiff's
removal. The plaintiff paid rent up to the date of the notice to quit. The
plaintiff was refused compensation upon the ground that he did not have
any interest in the land. The result reached seems to be correct, as it
seems that under the circumstances the breach of the plaintiff's contract
was too remote a consequence of the city's action to be properly attribut-
able to it, and that, as stated by the court, the plaintiff's remedy was to
seek his damages upon the contract. In Omnia Commercial Co. v. United
States, supra note 54, impossibility of performance of a contract was a
legally remote consequence of exercise of the war powers, and compensa-
tion was therefore properly denied. In Cornell-Andrews Smelting Co. N.
Boston and Providence Ry. Corp., 209 Mass. 298, 306, 95 N. E. 887, 890
(1911); it was held that in awarding compensation to a lessee the value
of an option to purchase could not be taken into consideration. It was
held that the option did not constitute an estate in the land, but was only
a contract right, which in equity shifted to the fund produced by the con-
demnation award to the lessor. A statute provided for payment of the
fund to a trustee in this contingency. The decision seems correct.
Whatever the nature of the property interests in a corpse may be, it
has been held that they cannot be made the subject of eminent domain
proceedings. University of Louisville v. Metcalfe, 216 Ky. 339, 387 S. W.
945 (1926).
11s In the matter of the District of the City of Pittsburgh, 2 W. & S.
320 (Pa. 1841); Forbes Street, 70 Pa. St. 125 (1371); Bush v. McKeesport
City, 166 Pa. St. 57, 30 Atl. 1023 (1895).
119In Philadelphia Parkway, 250 Pa. St. 257, 95 AtI. 429 (1915), the
court indicates an intention to limit the earlier cases to situations where
the filing of the plat is a net benefit to the owner of the land, through
enabling him to know where the future channels of travel and transporta-
tion will be located.
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property.120 The almost complete unanimity of the courts in this
connection no doubt has been due to the obviously serious char-
acter of the effect of such a situation upon the usability or
salability of the owner's title.
When the Illinois constitution of 1870 was framed, an attempt
was made to insure protection to condemnees, in spite of the
physical conception of property so largely used by the courts,
by inserting the words "or damaged" after the word "taken"
in the usual constitutional provision, so as to read, that private
property shall not be taken "or damaged" for public use without
just compensation. 121 Similar provisions have now been adopted
in the constitutions of a majority of the states.122 In opening the
debate upon this provision in the constitutional convention, Mr.
William H. Underwood, advocating its adoption, said:
"The courts have decided that cities in their grading, may cut
down lots so as to almost ruin men and subject them to enor-
mous expense, or they may raise the grade of streets so as to
cause water to run upon lots, and make property comparatively
worthless, but that that is a damage for which lot-owners are
entitled to no compensation. That seems the settled law of the
land; so decided in several states, and by the Supreme Court of
the United States. They say it is not taking property, but is an
incidental damage which lot-owners must sustain, by reason of
these public improvements, and for which they are entitled to
no compensation. As I understand this article, it will require
compensation to be made for those damages which necessarily
and naturally rise to a party in consequence of these public
improvements." 123
The debates indicate that the framers of -the Illinois Constitu-
tion were greatly influenced by the use of the word "damage"
in the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act,124 and its judicial inter-
pretation in England.121
The leading decision interpreting such a provision as that of
the Illinois Constitution is Rigney v. City of Chicago,'" decided
120 1 LEwis, 431; 1 NICHOLS, 282.
121 ILL. CONST. (1870), art. 2, sec. 13.
122 2 NICHOLS, 844.
123 2 DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF
ILLINOIS (1870) 1577.
124 Ibid. 1578. See Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 8 & 9 Vict. c. 18,
§§ 18, 49 (1845). This act requires that compensation be paid for the
lands purchased, and also "for the damage, if any, to be sustained by tho
owner of the lands by reason of the severing of the lands taken from the
other lands of such owner, or otherwise injuriously affecting such
lands ......
125 The English law as to compensation for injurious affection of lands,
as developed under this and other acts, is set forth in 6 HIALsBUitY, LAWS
OF ENGLAND (1909) 43 ff.
126 102 Ill. 64 (1882).
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by the Supreme Court of Illinois in 1882. The plaintiff was
awarded compensation because of obstruction of access to a
street through the erection of a viaduct. Mr. Justice Mulkey, in
the opinion of the court, three of the seven justices dissenting,
points out that under the previously existing constitutional pro-
vision in Illinois, of the usual type, an "actual physical invasion"
of property was required.2 7 His reasoning proceeds: While an
actual appropriation or taking was not required, it being enough
that the injury was direct and physical, nevertheless many cases
of great hardship were excluded, such as the case at bar. Under
the old provision, it was the view of the Illinois courts that "any
direct physical injury to the property" of an individual, by means
of which he was substantially deprived of its ordinary use and en-
joyment, was a taking. Under the amended provision the re-
quirement of physical injury is not abandoned. There has been,
however, ambiguity in tfie judicial statements of the Illinois
courts as to the facts necessary to constitute physical injury, be-
cause of the use by the courts of the term "property" in this con-
nection. This ambiguity can be obviated, and the change in the
constitution given proper effect, by adopting the conception of
property as consisting of legal relations. Therefore, he con-
cludes, "under the present constitution it is sufficient if there
is a direct physical obstruction or injury to the right of user or
enjoyment, by which the owner sustains some special pecuniary
damage in excess of that sustained by the public generally." -3
It seems unfortunate that the court should retain a physical
requirement in the test for an obstruction or injury to what it
so carefully points out are intangibles, and the opinion indicates
the difficulty in abandoning physical concepts in habits of
thought. Just what the court has in mind in requiring a "direct
physical obstruction or injury" to legal relations is not clear. It
is not discussed in the opinion, and is not made clear in other
cases."' Other parts of the opinion would seem to eliminate the
127 Ibid. 74.
128 Ibid. 72, 78. At another place in the opinion the requirement is stated
in somewhat different form. It is said that "to warrant a recovery it
must appear there has been some direct physical disturbance of a right,
either public or private, which the plaintiff enjoys in connection with his
property, and which gives to it an additional value, and that by reason of
such disturbance he has sustained a special damage with respect to his
property in excess of that sustained by the public generally." Ibid. 80.
129 Halsbury states that "physical interference" is required. 6 HILBILY,
op. cit. supra note 125,- at 32, 46. In Lambert v. Norfolk, 108 Va. 259,
265, 61 S. E. 776, 778 (1908), it is stated that there must be physical
damage to the corpus or to some appurtenant right, and that the damage
must be physical, not to the "feelings, tastes, or sentiments." Other cases
stating the requirement that the interference with legal relations must be
physical are: Austin v. Augusta Terminal Ry., 10S Ga. 671, 674, 34 S. E.
852, 857 (1899); Illinois Power & Light Corporation v. Peterson, 322 Ill.
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requirement. Possibly it is reasonable to conclude that the state-
ment of the requirement, while unfortunate from the stand-
point of lucidity of the concepts used in legal thinking, has pro-
duced no practical ill effects. It is pointed out in the opinion that
the amended constitutional provision is not intended to reach
every possible injury that may be occasioned by a public improve-
ment.130 This is obviously correct, as every injury sustained by
an individual in an organized society is not legally remediable.
Toward the end of the opinion the view of the English courts in
construing the term "injuriously affected" is adopted, particu-
larly as set forth in McCarthy v. Metropolitan Board of Works.""
It is therefore felt that "it was the intention of the framers of the
present constitution to require compensation to be made in all
cases where, but for some legislative enactment, an action would
lie by the common law." 232 This statement of principle, unlike
the earlier portion of the opinion which has been referred to,
does not include any physical requirement. It treats the problem
simply as one of working out principles of the law of damages in
accordance with the social policy of eminent domain proceed-
ings.13 3 While the principles developed in other connections will
not always afford a sufficient guide,"3 4 certainly all possible bene-
342, 347, 153 N. E. 577, 579 (1926); East St. Louis Light & Power Co. v.
Cohen, 333 Ill. 218, 222, 164 N. E. 182, 184 (1928); Stuhl v. Great North-
ern Ry., 136 Minn. 158, 161, 161 N. W. 501, 502 (1917); Gottschalk v.
Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 14 Neb. 550, 560, 16 N. W. 475, 479, 14 Neb. 561,
17 N. W. 120 (1883); Haney v. G. C. & S. F. Ry, 3 Will. § 278, § 279
(Tex. Civ. App. 1887). On the facts none of the cases cited throw any
light upon the content of the requirement.
130 Rigney v. City of Chicago, supra note 126, at 80.
131 L. R. 7 C. P. 508 (1872).
232 Rigney v. City of Chicago, supra note 126, at 81.
"'3 A similar conclusion has been reached in interpreting such a provi-
sion in the constitution of another state. City of Tulsa v. Horwitz, 131
Okla. 63, 65, 267 Pac. 852, 854 (1928). The opinion quotes with approval
20 C. J. 674, to the effect that such a constitutional provision includes "all
damages or injuries arising from the exercise of the right of eminent
domain which cause a diminution in the value of private property, whether
this results directly to the property, or is but an interference with the
right which the owner has to the legal and proper use of the same." See
City of Amarillo v. Tutor, 267 S. W. 697, 699 (Tex. Comm. of App. 1924).
The encyclopedia immediately follows the quotation with an incorpora-
tion in its text of the requirement, "generally held," of a "physical inter-
ference."
Dillon suggests that under such a constitutional provision recovery
"must ... be limited to cases where the corpus of the owner's property It-
self, or some appurtenant right or easement connected therewith or by the
law annexed thereto, is directly (that is, in general, if not always, physi-
cally) affected, and is also specially affected (that is, in a manner not
common to the property owner and to the public at large) ; and such direct
and special injury must be such as to depreciate the value of the owner's
property". 3 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911) 1610.
134 For example, at common law, with few exceptions, a man may build
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fit should be derived from the general law of damages wherever
the situations presented are essentially analogous.13
Nichols argues that the states which have failed to adopt con-
stitutional provisions in regard to "damaging" as well as "tak-
ing" property have indicated by such failure their deliberate
choice of a physical conception of property in thiis connection.'"
He therefore concludes that it is no longer open to question in
those states that a "damaging" does not constitute a "taking".
This would mean that in such a state no court could with pro-
priety adopt for eminent domain purposes a conception of prop-
erty as consisting of legal relations. It is submitted that this
view is entirely erroneous, as it overlooks the difficulties to be
encountered and the popular inertia to be overcome in securing
any constitutional amendment.1
-7
It has been pointed out that under a legal relations conception
of property a constitutional amendment adding "damaging" to
"taking" is unnecessary.' In this connection it has been sug-
gested, not only that the cases adopting a physical conception
have been too narrow in giving a meaning to the term "prop-
erty", but also that they have erred "in holding that the right
of recovery rested upon the constitution, rather than upon the
common law or upon an inherent right superior to any legis-
lative enactment." '3" That portion of the argument which re-
lates to "inherent right" would be rejected by many modern
thinkers, but the contention can well stand without that support.
If the view that there is a principle of justice, apart from consti-
tutions, requiring compensation is adopted, the only effect of a
constitutional provision in regard to compensation is to prevent
the legislature from destroying the citizen's right to receive it.
It has been suggested that when a "damaged" provision is
any sort of an erection upon his own land. A different problem is pre-
sented when an erection is built in a street.
133 See note 175, infra.
136 1 NICHOLS, 306.
137 In this connection the writer recalls an interesting round table dis-
cussion at one of the meetings of the Association of American Law Schools.
Professor Edwin R. Keedy, of the University of Pennsylvania, outlined a
nwnber of needed reforms in the field of criminal procedure. Professor
Edson R. Sunderland, of the University of Michigan, the great leader of
the American bar in matters of procedural reform, opened the discussion
with remarks commencing about as follows: "Why is it that Mr. Keedy
can present in fifteen minutes reforms which we all agree are good, and
which it would take about one hundred years to put into effect? The rea-
sons can all be summed up in one word-constitutions."
13 Mr. Justice Whiting, in Hyde v. Minnesota, Dakota & Pacific Ry.,
29 S. D. 220, 2:30. 136 N. W. 92, 95 (1912) ; Davis, Constitzutional Proviions
Against Damagiag Private Property (1902) 8 VA. L. REG. 525.
139 See Hyde v. Minnesota, Dakota & Pacific Ry.. su!pra note 138, at 23fl,
136 N. W. at 95. Consult Grant, op. cit. supra note 3.
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added, "taking" should be restricted to cases where the owner is
deprived of title.1'4 Frequently constitutions require payment of
compensation in advance in case of a taking, but not in connec-
tion with a damaging.141 For this purpose there are practical
considerations in support -of a distinction based upon the im-
portance of the legal relations affected. There is also more liber-
ality in granting injunctive relief in connection with acts con-
sidered takings than with those thought of as only amounting to
the infliction of damage.142 A distinction here based upon the ex-
tent of the consequences of the contemplated action is in har-
mony with fundamental principles of the law of injunctions.
The problem of the nature of the conception to be used in ad-
ministering eminent domain proceedings has sometimes been
presented in situations where there unquestionably has occurred
a taking of property, under either of the concepts discussed. A
question has arisen as to what parties are to be recognized as
having property interests entitling them to compensation, or it
has been necessary to determine how far the property interests
of those receiving compensation extend. 43 In the solution of any
problem, the selection of the persons to receive compensation,
and of the elements of loss or injury to be taken into considera-
tion in assessing damages, is a measure of the extent of property.
It is settled that life tenants and tenants for years or from
year to year are entitled to compensation. 144 On the other hand,
it seems clear that tenants by sufferance and trespassers have no
legal relations entitling them to compensation.141 It generally
has been so held in regard to tenants at will.1 40 This result has
140 Mr. Justice Crow, in Milwaukee Terminal Ry. v. City of Seattle, 86
Wash. 102, 107, 149 Pac. 644, 646 (1915). See Fenton v. City of Seattle,
132 Wash. 194, 198, 231 Pac. 795, 796 (1925). The distinction is jurisdic-
tional in the Court of Claims. In connection with a taking there is an
implied contract to pay, and jurisdiction. A damaging constitutes only
a tort, when there is no jurisdiction. Sanguinetti v. United States, 55 Ct.
Cl. 107 (1920), aff'd, cit. supra note 83; of. State of Alabama v. United
States, 282 U. S. 502, 51 Sup. Ct. 225 (1931).
141 1 NIcHOLs, 307.
142 2 LEwis, 1611.
143 See Matter of City of N. Y. (Manhattan Ry.) 126 Misc. 879, 216 N.
Y. Supp. 2 (Sup. Ct. 1926); modified, 229 App. Div. 617, 243 N. Y. Supp.
665 (1st Dep't 1930); Note (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 779; Nelles, A Constrav-
tive "Property Right" and Its "Value" (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 1074; Corbin,
The Elevated Railway Condemnation Case-Another Analysis of th
Property Interests Involved (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 1039. This case pre-
sents the interesting and novel question whether, upon codemnation of an
elevated railroad in a city street, the railway company is entitled to com-
pensation for the right to impair light, air, and access.
'44 2 LEwis, 952; 1 NiCHOLS, 338.
145 1 NICHOLs, 340, 343.
146 United States v. Inlots, Fed. Cas. No. 15,441a (S. D. Ohio, 1873);
Emerson v. City of Somerville, 166 Mass. 115, 44 N. E. 110 (1896); Hanna
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been reached, apparently, either upon the theory that a tenancy
at will has no market value, or upon the technical theory that the
nature of the estate is such as to render impossible its consider-
ation in eminent domain proceedings.
The facts of one of the cases denying compensation to tenants
at will .47 present the question whether such a holding accomp-
lishes, as far as is practicable, the social purpose of eminent do-
main proceedings to prevent loss to condemnees. The tenants at
wNill were liquor dealers, renting from a brewer. They purchased
their beer from the landlord, and as rent paid him tventy-five
cents per barrel more than the usual price. The tenants had re-
lied upon the arrangement sufficiently, and had considered it of
enough value, to erect a number of buildings upon the land. It
was a reasonable inference that the lessor was profiting by the
arrangement, and that, as a practical matter, he would have per-
mitted it to continue indefinitely if condemnation had not inter-
vened. It was held that termination of the lessor's estate by con-
demnation proceedings determined the lease of the tenants at
will, and made them tenants at sufferane of the condemning au-
thority, and they were refused compensation. It was said, by
way of dictum, that the change in the nature of the tenancy was
not of any practical importance, as all that they were entitled
to in any event was notice, and a reasonable time to remove their
goods and fixtures.
Looking at the situation from the standpoint of the legal rela-
tions of the human beings involved, the lessees had a conditional
privilege to continue to use the premises, subject to a power of
revocation in the landlord. They had a right that they should
not be interfered with before such revocation. The question
presented is whether, assuming that a financial value to the
lessees is involved, it is not practicable, in eminent domain pro-
ceedings, to recognize such legal relations as constituting prop-
erty, for-which compensation should be made. Such action does
not call for reduction of the compensation to be paid the land-
v. County of Hampden, 250 Mass. 107, 145 N. E. 258 (1924); Lyons v.
Philadelphia & R. Ry., 209 Pa. St. 550, 58 Atl. 924 (1904); Canadian
Pacific R. W. Co. v. Brown Milling Co., 18 Ont. L. Rep. 85 (1909) (not
"person interested," under Canadian act). Contra: Sheehan v. City of
Fall River, 187 Mass. 356, 73 N. E. 544 (1905) ; Cole v. Ellwood Power Co.,
216 Pa. 283, 65 Atl. 678 (1907). Sheehan v. City of Fall River is unlike
the other cases cited in this note in that the tenancy at will continued to
exdst. The grade of a street was changed, under a statute providing for
the payment of "all damages sustained by any person in his property."
The lessee was awarded damages because of injury to a building which,
as between her and the owner of the fee, was a tenant's ftxture, subject
to removal. She also received compensation because of temporary inter-
ference with access. A settlement by the condemning authority with the
landowner had not included her damages.
'47 Lyons v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co., supm-a note 140.
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lord, as the presence of satisfied tenants does not lessen the
market value of the premises or their value to him.
If the condemning authority secures a conveyance from the
owner of the fee, the problem is still in substance the same. Such
a conveyance is voluntary only in the sense that the owner is
willing to submit gracefully, rather than to await condemnation
proceedings. The question remains, whether, as matter of sound
social policy, compensation should not be paid to the tenant at
will because of the proximate effect of such action upon his legal
relations. It may seem that an affirmative answer will mean that
a condemning authority will be required to pay more to secure
land than a private individual. It may be said that while the
latter can purchase from the owner of the fee and let the owner
terminate the tenancy, the condemning authority will have to
make payment to both parties. But while the private purchaser
will have only one payment to make, in the bargaining process
he will not have the assistance of a threat of eminent domain
proceedings. It is therefore doubtful whether, in the long run,
the condemning authority will be out more than the private
buyer. Even though an additional payment is required, there is
still reason for holding that the legal relations of the parties
should be adjusted in this way. Forced transactions and volun-
tary ones are not the same. A valuable economic situation is cre-
ated when land is occupied by satisfied tenants, regardless of the
character of the legal tenure. Both landlords and tenants pay
brokers substantial sums to create such situations, and no suffi-
cient reason is seen why courts should be blind to them. If both
landlord and tenant sustain losses, both should be awarded com-
pensation..
The practical situation is essentially the same where, as the
result of condemnation proceedings against the landlord (or pur-
chase by the condemning authority from him), a tenant from
year to year is given the required notice to quit. Lord Tender-
den's reasoning in awarding compensation to such a tenant 149
under the Hungerford Market Act 149 is capable of wide applica-
148EX Parte Farlow, 2 B. & Ad. 341 (K. B. 1831). King v. Hungerford
Market Co. (Ex Parte Still), 4 B. & Ad. 592 (K. B. 1833). Accord, as to
tenant ousted at expiration of fixed term, King v. Hungerford Market Co.
(Ex Parte Gosling), 4 B. & Ad. 596 (K. B. 1833).
1
49 Loc. & Pers. Pub. Acts 11 GEo. iv c. 70 (1830). The language of
this statute differs from the American constitutional provisions. In § 19
it specifically includes tenants at will and occupiers among those entitled
to compensation, and provides, inter alia, for the payment of compensation
to any person who "shall or may sustain or be put unto any loss, damage,
or injury, in respect of any interest whatsoever, for good-will, improve-
ments, tenant's fixtures, or otherwise, which they may now enjoy by reason
of the passing of this Act." From a legal relations standpoint it is be-
lieved that these differences, except as to the reference to occupiers (who,




"Now it seems perfectly clear that if this act had not passed,
the tenants and occupiers would not have been all dispossessed,
as they will be under the act. It is said 'the interest which they
now enjoy' must be taken to mean a legal interest, and that all
legal interest was determined by the notice to quit. But I think
this is not the fair meaning of the words, and that they must be
understood as signifying that sort of right which an occupier
ordinarily has, of paiting with his tenancy to another person
for such sum as he may be induced to give for goodwill, fixtures,
and improvements, and which is often very considerable though
the tenancy be only from year to year, where there is a confidence
that it will not be put an end to. This interest, feeble as it may
be (since it is always determinable at a short notice), may justly
be considered as matter of value to the owner, and to any other
party who becomes the purchaser." °
In a Maryland case a tenant who had had a number of suc-
cessive leases, each for a term of one year, was awarded compen-
sation for loss of the possibility of renewal. Mr. Justice Bryan
said:
"The evidence tended to show that Rice's brickyard, though
held by a precarious tenure, had a large market value. A thing
is worth what it can be sold for. If Rice's interest would sell
properly could be recognized in such proceedings), are immaterial. The
learned justices stressed the inclusion of the term "good-vill." See Ex
Parte Farlow, supra note 148, at 347. The reporters, at 349, have at-
tached a note in regard to another case where the tenant held "on an
agreement for one year certain from Michaelmas 1822, with liberty to the
landlord afterwards to determine the tenancy in any year at three months'
notice, and with a stipulation also that the tenant should not underlet or
give up possession of the premises without leave in writing. The Court
was of opinion that these conditions of holding, especially the last, es-
sentially distinguished this case from the preceding . .. " In a note to
King v. Hungerford Market Co. (Ex Parte Still), szpra note 148, at 595,
the reporters state, as to the interest of the tenants in the three cases
cited supra note 148: "Such an interest, it may be presumed, would be
too slight and precarious to be noticed at law or in equity, if it were not
upheld .. . by conclusive words in an Act of Parliament." In a case under
another statute, the Liverpool and Manchester Railway Act, Loc. & Pers.
Pub. Acts 7 GEo. iv c. 49 § 47 (1826), where the term "good-will" was
omitted, a distinction was made upon that ground, and compensation
denied to a tenant for a fixed term ousted at the expiration of his term,
the condemning authority having taken a'deed from the reversioner. The
tenant was said to have "merely a hope of renewal on the old terms, which,
if there has been an improvement, were not likely to be granted, where
there would have been a competition." Lord Denman, in King v. Liverpool
and Manchester Ry., 4 Ad. & E. 650, 656 (K. B. 1836). This result was
reached, although the act included occupiers, and provided for compensa-
tion for "detriment, injury, damage, loss, inconvenience, or prejudice."
'1OEx Parte Farlow, supra note 148, at 345.
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for $4,000, it is worth $4,000, and the destruction of it would in-
jure him to that extent. It would be confiscation, pure and sim-
ple, to take it from him without paying him its value. It is not a
question of the permanency of his title to real estate, but of the
salable value of such interest as he had.... The jury had a right
to consider the probability of a renewal of Rice's term, because
the evidence tended to show that this circumstance increased
its market value." r1
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts expressly re-
fused to follow this case. Mr. Chief Justice Holmes said, refer-
ring to the facts of the case he was then deciding:
"It appeared that the owners had been in the habit of renewing
the petitioners' lease from time to time, and an attempt Was made
to give this fact the aspect of an English customary right. The
evidence merely showed that the landlords and the tenants were
mutually satisfied and were likely to keep on together. It added
nothing except by way of corroboration to the testimony that
they both intended to keep on. Changeable intentions are not an
interest in land, and although no doubt such intentions may have
added practically to the value of the petitioners' holding, they
could not be taken into account in determining what the re-
spondent should pay. They added nothing to the tenants' legal
rights, and legal rights are all that must be paid for. For as
under the statutes the land was to be valued as a whole, and then
the amount subdivided (St. 1896, c. 516, sec. 23; Pub. St. c. 112,
secs. 95, 100, 107; Id., c. 49, secs. 18, 22, 25), the view opposite
to ours would allow the tenants to diminish the share of the
landowners on the strength of the latter having entertained an
intention which they were free to change if they chose." 152
151 Mayor of Baltimore v. Rice, 73 Md. 307, 311, 21 Atl. 181, 182 (1891).
The landlords' agent testified that the land in question was part of a larger
tract which had been leased to numerous tenants in this way for half a
century. The owners derived large revenues from such leases, and never
removed a tenant who paid his rent promptly. A number of the tenants
had erected expensive improvements, and the agent testified that he had no
doubt that the expectation of a renewal added largely to the market value
of their interests.
Under a Canadian statute the possibility of securing renewal of a lease
has been taken into consideration in assessing damages. McGoldrick v.
King, 8 Can. Exch. 169 (1902). Likewise, under a statute, in condemnation
proceedings against a hotel, possibility of securing renewal of the liquor
license has been taken into consideration. In re Cavanagh and Canada
Atlantic Ry., 14 Ont. L. R. 523, 529 (1907).
152 Emery v. Boston Terminal Co., 178 Mass. 172, 185, 59 N. E. 763, 765
(1901). The case involved the taking of a wharf. At the time possession
was taken, the tenants were in under a lease for a fixed term. It was hold
that evidence was correctly excluded which would, at most, have proved




Under the terminology suggested by Hohfeld, the tenants in
this case had beneficial liabilities ','3 to have created in each of
them, at the expiration of the exsting term, the group of legal
relations constituting the position of tenant for a future term.
The landlords had correlative powers '- to bring these legal re-
lations into existence. These powers and liabilities were de-
stroyed by the condemnation proceedings. This was done with-
out regard to the volition of the individuals concerned, and if
they thereby sustained substantial loss, the social policy of emi-
nent domain proceedings required that they receive compensa-
tion. In making practical adjustments of such matters, in the
absence of relevant evidence it could well be assumed that neither
landlord nor tenant would enter into a lease upon an improvident
basis, in accordance with what the court or jury might conceive
to be their respective standpoints. But the best evidence as to
what they would do is what they have done in the past, and in a
case involving a tenant who is in possession, this evidence will
ordinarily be present. Assuming similar conditions, this should
govern the determination of the amount of their respective
losses, and any opinion of court or jury as to the improvidence
of either would be irrelevant. It seems that a court would have
no hesitation in thus adjusting a situation involving interrup-
tion of a lease during its term. In such a situation the extent
of the losses of the landlord and tenant will depend upon the na-
ture of the contract between them, and it is clear that their re-
spective shares of the compensation should be apportioned ac-
cordingly.
Using a different method of approach, when a possibility of
renewal of a lease is destroyed, a court should not feel compelled
by juristic necessity to refuse compensation to the tenant. It will
not be questioned that a landlord and tenant have a right that
third parties shall not interfere, by duress or other wrongful
acts, with the future course of their mutual dealings. While there
is no element of wrongdoing in instituting eminent domain pro-
ceedings, nevertheless it is a question of policy whether society
should not recognize in the tenant a right not to be interfered
with by such proceedings, so that, in case of invasion of the right,
he will be entitled to compensation. It is simply a question
whether an attempt should be made to compensate him for an
actual loss sustained in that way.
It is stated, in the opinion quoted, that the Massachusetts
statutes require that the land be valued as a whole, and the
amount divided among the various claimants. Interpreting the
statutes from a legal relations standpoint, in referring to land '
133 HOFEIELD, op. cit supra note 1, at 36, 58.
154 Ibid. 50.
-z; While the distinction is not material in the present connection, from
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they do not refer to the physical earth, but to the legal relations
which sufficiently involve the enjoyment of certain physical earth
so as to be cognizable in the statutory proceedings. A determina-
tion as to where to draw the line, as to what legal relations should
be so recognized, should be made upon considerations of social
poicy, tempered by the requirements of expediency. The sug-
gestion that an award to the tenant will necessarily diminish
that to the landlord, has already been considered. It may be
granted that the general attitute of the courts, both English and
American, is such as to justify the conclusion that on legalistic
grounds they will refuse to grant the tenant relief in this con-
nection.
The value of land, and of most other objects of value, is based
almost entirely upon unenforceable expectations in regard to the
conduct of other persons.156 When the courts, in any connection,
arbitrarily refuse to consider such expectations, they are closing
their eyes to the most important facts of economic existence. The
question has often been asked, how much good a million dollars
would do a person upon a desert island. The problem of the ef-
fect of expectations upon value was presented in concrete form
in a case in which the damages caused by the abolition of a grade
crossing were being assessed. It was urged that in determining
the value of the petitioners' land its proximity to railroad facil-
ities could not be taken into consideration, as the petitioners had
no right to compel their continuance. Mr. Justice Loring, of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, anticipating in 1901
the work of the behaviourists, said:
"If the respondent were right in its contention that this fact
could not be considered because the petitioners had no legal right
to have the spur tracks continue, the fact that a lot of land is in
the business portion of a city or town in place of in the residen-
tial or other less valuable portion of it, could not be taken into
consideration in determining its market value; the owner of a
lot of land in the business centre of a city has no legal right to
have the business of the city done in that neighborhood; but the
fact that it is done there, and is likely to continue to be done
there, is a fact which affects the market value of the land." 1l
a legal relations standpoint a statute referring to "land" presents a dif-
ferent problem from that arising under a constitutional provision that
"property" shall not be taken. Such a statute requires that the legal rela-
tions involved have a reasonably close connection with the enjoyment of
physical earth. The constitutional provision is not so limited.
156 "Market value" represents a "series of annual incomes capitalized
into a fund of value." ELY AND MOREHOUSE, ELEMENTS OF LAND ECONOM-
iCs (1924) 241.




Under a physical conception of the process involved in eminent
domain proceedings, when part of a tract of land is physically
appropriated the owner may recover the amount of the damage
to the remainder of the tract, even though there could have been
no recovery for such damage, standing by itself.253 The distinc-
tion thus based upon the taking of a part of the tract is made
because of the necessity that is felt that some sort of a physical
appropriation be found to constitute a taking. This requirement
having been satisfied, all the damages sustained are awarded,
and no difficulty is felt because of the source of any portion of
the loss. The entire amount of the damages is thought of as being
damage because of the taking. There seems to be no justification
for the distinction, other than legalistic, unless as a protection
against the assertion of fictitious claims. The slight effect in that
regard does not seem to be sufficient to justify the discrimination
between two classes of citizens. If the problems of eminent do-
main proceedings are approached from a legal relations stand-
point, there is no necessity for the distinction, and, in fact, it is
entirely meaningless. 1' - From this standpoint, as has been sug-
gested, any assessment of damages is a measurement of the ex-
tent of property.
Under a physical conception of the eminent domain process,
the total amount of the compensation paid the owners of various
estates in a single res must necessarily equal the total value of
the r'es, standing as a unit in a single fee simple estate. From a
physical standpoint the law has no concern with the existence of
various estates. If the value of the res is assessed and paid, the
damages have equalled the extent of the taking, and that amount
must be divided among the owners of the various interests. From
a legal relations viewpoint, the situation of each individual in-
volved must be separately examined, and the total compensation
paid may or may not be more than the value of the land, held as
a single fee simple estate. It was said, in a Massachusetts case,
that the relations among themselves of those having various es-
tates in the same tract of land could not be taken into consider-
ation, upon the ground that contracts between the owners of the
various interests could not be permitted to "affect the right of
the government to take the land for the public use, or oblige it to
pay by way of compensation more than the entire value of the
1z3 2 LEwis, 1176; 2 NicHOLs, 721, 852, 896. Various tracts owned by
the same owner are treated as separate tracts for purposes of the distinc-
tion. 2 Lnwis, 1207; 2 NicHOLS, 737.
259 The distinction is criticized in County Court of Marion Co., W. Va.
v United States, 53 Ct. Cl. 120, 139 (1918), and Queen v. Essex, 17 Q. B.
D. 447, 452 (1886), rev'd, sub. iwr. Cowper -Essex v. Local Board for
Action, 14 App. Cas. 153 (1889), and questioned by Mr. Justice Holmes in
Lincoln v. Commonwealth, 164 Mass. 368, 375, 41 N. E. 489, 490 (1895).
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land as a whole." 11" The physical viewpoint is apparent. In an-
other case, in the same court, it was admitted that the sum of
the market worth of the various interests, valued separately,
might exceed the market value of the entire interest in the land,
considered as one estate.'-, It was said that it did not follow that
it was unjust to the owners of the various interests to use the
latter method of computation. No reason for this conclusion was
given, but it follows naturally from the use of a physical con-
cept.
In a third case, 16 2 in the same court, the facts were reversed,
and the value of the land as a whole was greater than the actual
damage to the owners of the various interests. Land was being
condemned for street purposes which was already subject to a
private easement of way, light, and air in favor of one of the
parties to the proceeding. It was agreed that if the land was to
be regarded as though held in a fee simple estate by a single
owner it was worth $60,000, but that the damages actually caused
the parties were only $5,000. The court seized upon the fact
that the statute under which the later proceedings were had pro-
vided for compensation for the "damages sustained by the
owners," and awarded the smaller sum. From the standpoint of
adjustment of the legal ielations involved, this result is correct,
but consistency would have required a holding that what had been
taken was an entire single estate in the land, and that, regard-
less of the provisions of the statute, the constitutional provi-
sion in regard to the taking of property required compensation
for that estate. The decision was affirmed by the Supreme
Court of the United States. Mr. Justice Holmes said:
"The only question to be considered is whether when a man's
land is taken he is entitled, by the Fourteenth Amendment to
recover more than the value of it as it stood at the time ...
It is true that the mere mode of occupation does not necessarily
limit the right of an owner's recovery. [citing cases] But the
Constitution does not require a disregard of the mode of owner-
ship-of the state of the title. It does not require a parcel of land
to be valued as an unencumbered whole when it is not held as
an unencumbered whole. It merely requires that an owner of
property taken should be paid for what is taken from him. It
deals with persons, not with tracts of land. And the question is
160 Mr. Chief Justice Gray, in Burt v. Merchants' Insurance Co., 115
Mass. 1, 15 (1874). In the view which the court took of the case, the
statement quoted was dictum. The case was a condemnation proceeding
instituted by the United States in the name of an agent. The same state-
ment was quoted as dictum in Cornell-Andrews Smelting Co. v. Boston &
P. R. Corp., 209 Mass. 298, 305, 95 N. E. 887, 890 (1911).
161 Edmands v. Boston, 108 Mass. 535, 549 (1871).
162 Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 195 Mass. 338, 81
N. E. 244 (1907), aff'd, cit. supra note 26.
[Vol, 41
1EMINENT DOMAIN
what has the owner lost, not what has the taker gained. 3 We
regard it as entirely plain that the petitioners were not entitled
as matter of law to have the damages estimated as if the land
was the sole property of one owner. ." 
This reasoning, applied consistently, would seem upon con-
stitutional grounds to prevent use of the value of the land as a
single estate to limit the compensation paid the owners of the
various interests.0 5
In a case involving a ground rent, Mr. Justice Boyd, of the
Court of Appeals of Mlalyland, recognized that in order to do
justice to all the palties concerned, it would sometimes be neces-
sary to make exceptions to the general rule of valuing the land
as a single estate and then dividing the proceeds. He said:
"... We are ...of the opinion that owing to the peculiar
character of this class of property, if it be proven that the rever-
sioner's interest was worth $10,000 and the leaseholder's $52,500,
the latter sum could be allowed, although the whole property, if
no ground rent had been on it, would only have been worth
$60,000. We say that because each is entitled under the Consti-
tution to be compensated in damages for the amount of his in-
terest taken, and, if it be true that the values of the two inter-
ests are more than what the lots would be worth, if owned by one
person, the necessities of the case require an apparent exception
to the general rule announced above as to what the condemning
party must pay.... Indeed when a piece of property which is
subject to an ordinary lease for a short term is taken, it may
happen that although the owner of the fee is allowed full value
for the property, the tenant must also be paid a large and sub-
stantial amount in addition, by reason of the value of his
lease." 166
When condemnation of land necessitates removal or discon-
tinuance of a business which has been conducted upon it, ele-
ments of damage such as loss of profits, destruction of good will
or going concern values, or expenses of removal, are frequently
present. The speculative character of the losses often is such as
to justify, upon practical grounds, a refusal to.attempt to assess
the damages. The decision as to whether compensation should
be made generally has been reached, however, upon purely legal-
163 This is the usual method of approach. Hale, I'ale to the Ta:cr iz.
Condemndtion Cases (1931) 31 COL. L. REV. 1. This article discusses the
interesting question whether special value of the premises to the taker can
be permitted to affect the market value, as determined for purposes of
compensation. IbWi. 10.
164 Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, supra note 26, at 194,
30 Sup. Ct. at 460.
3
65 Gf. cases discussed in 2 Luwis, 1253, and 1 NicnoLs, 707, 709.
166 Mayor of City of Baltimore v. Latrobe, 101 Md. 621, 631, 61 At.
203, 206 (1905); see State v. Hall, 28 S. W. (2d) 80, 82 (3[o. 1930).
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istic grounds, with a physical conception of the eminent domain
process in mind.lr Thus, Mr. Justice Brandeis has said:
"There is no finding as a fact that the Government took the
business, or that what it did was intended as a taking. If the
business was destroyed, the destruction was an unintended inci-
dent of the taking of lands." 168
In another case compensation for business losses was refused,
although a statute provided for compensation for "all damages
that may be sustained," as it was reasoned that the petitioners
were claiming only as landholders suffering from the taking of a
portion of their land.16" From the standpoint of the legal rela-
tions involved, in all cases of business losses there has been vio-
lation of the right of the one owning or leasing the land, and
conducting the business thereon, not to be disturbed in his oc-
cupancy of the premises, and to the extent that such right has
been violated his property has been taken. Mr. Justice John B.
Gibson, before he became Chief Justice, based a refusal of com-
pensation in such a case upon the ground that such losses are
"only collateral to the assuming of the rights of the citizen." I'l
In reply to the cases denying compensation for loss of profits, it
has been well said:
"By changing the words of Lord Coke from 'What is property
but the use thereof' into 'What is business but the profits there-
from,' the contention that the business is not taken or damaged
appears to be answered. Nothing could be more absurd than to
say that a retail grocery business forced through eminent do-
main proceedings to leave the community wherein each and every
one of its customers resided, is not taken or damaged." "I
In a case refusing compensation for expenses of removal, the
interesting suggestion is made that: "As the title to all property
is held subject to the implied condition that it must be surren-
167 Compensation generally has been denied. As to profits: 2 LEwIS,
1271; 1 NICHOLS, 698; 2 ibid. 1170, 1173. As to good will: 2 LEWIS, 1276;
1 NICHOLS, 366, 685, 698. As to expenses of removal: 2 LEWIS, 1274, 1277;
1 NICHOLS, 697. Contra, as to going concern values: 1 NICHOLS, 085;
semble, ibid. 665; 2 LEwis, 1176, 1228.
The English view is more liberal, and allows compensation for all the
items mentioned. 6 HALSBURy, 36.
16s Mitchell v. United States, supra note 82, at 345, 45 Sup. Ct. at 294.
In this case the flooding of land for reservoir purposes necessitated the
sale of cattle.
169 Mr. Chief Justice Shaw, in Boston and Worcester R.R. v. Old Colony
R. R., 12 Cush. (66 Mass.) 605, 611 (1853).
170 Schuylkill Navigation Co. v. Thoburn, 7 Serg. & R. 411, 422 (Pa.
1821). This is the great leading case in this connection.
171 (1916) 4 CALIF. L. REV. 248, 249.
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dered whenever the public interest requires it, the inconvenience
and expense incident to the surrender of possession are not ele-
ments to be considered in determining the damages to which
the owner is entitled." 172 The iiiiplication of such a condition,
without any consideration of the practical aspects of the situa-
tion, is a highly legalistic method of solution of the lroblem. If
such a condition is to be implied, presumably as a part of the
social compact, it would seem that the coult might well imply
a like condition that the fee simple title is held subject to the
existence of necessity for its surrender when required for the
public welfare, and thus avoid the payment of compensation alto-
gether. 273
It is neither necessary nor desirable that legalistic considera-
tions have any place in connection with the awarding of com-
pensation in eminent domain proceedings. Considerations of
policy should control. If from the standpoint of policy it is de-
sirable that a citizen have compensation, there should be no hesi-
tation, under constitutional provisions, in awarding it to him.
The legal relations of an individual cover every aspect of his
existence, hnd when there is violation of these relations his prop-
erty is taken.i- Manifestly, it is not practicable for society to
compensate the individual for every such consequence of con-
demnation proceedings, any more than it is feasible for the courts
to take into consideration the remote consequences of torts or
other occurrences. The problem is one of practical expediency.
The judicial experiences in the administration of eminent domain
proceedings- indicate that it is important that the problem be rec-
ognized, in this field as elsewhere, as one of drawing the line
172 Mr. Justice Clark, in Ranlet v. Concord R.R., 62 N. H. 5G1, 564
(1883).
173 In State v. Dawson, 3 Hill (21 S. C.) 100, 102, 104-105 (1836), it was
suggested that in every grant of land by the state there was an implied
reservation that land and timber and other materials might be taken for
road purposes. The authority to take land is dizcussed at length in Lind-
say v. East Bay Street Com'rs, 2 Bay (2 S. C.) 38 (1796). In Wilcox v.
Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19, 52, 29 Sup. Ct. 192, 200 (1909), where
a public utility was itself condemned, Mr. Justice Peckham put the refusal
of compensation for loss of "good will" values upon the ground that in the
case of monopolistic public utilities any question of "good will" is irrelevant.
This reasoning would undoubtedly strike a responsive chord in the minds
of many consumers, and does not seem to be open to criticism.
174 "If the railway encroaches in any degree upon the plaintiff's proprie-
tary rights, then it is clear that the constitutional inhibition, which for-
bids the taking of private property for public use 'without just compen-
sation,' applies to the case." Mr. Justice Selden, in Williams v. New York
Central R.R., 16 N. Y. 97, 100 (1857). The case involved an added bur-
den on a highway.
For an interesting comparative study of extensive interference with
legal relations -without compensation, see Barker, N-cw Laws and A'ational-
ism in Mexico (1927) 5 FOREIGN AFFAIs 589.
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between proximate and remote consequences.*17
It may be suggested that in all fields of thought the early,
simple concepts are of a physical character, and that advance is
made to concepts of a more abstract nature. Such a change may
be regarded as inevitable as more complicated problems are
solved or old problems are given more delicately adjusted solu-
tions. It may be suggested that the history of both the physical
and the social sciences evidences such development. 110 Whether
the general suggestion be justified or not, it is believed that the
thought is pertinent as applied to the field of eminent domain
and the accomplishment of the social purpose therein involved.
37 It is sometimes stated that the principles of the general law of
damages apply to acts done under the power of eminent domain. Peel
v. City of Atlanta, 85 Ga. 138, 140, 11 S. E. 582, 583 (1890); Austin v.
Augusta Terminal Ry., supra note 129, at 674, 34 S. E. at 853; Ttigney v.
City of Chicago, supra note 126, at 81; O'Brien v. City of St. Paul, 25
Minn. 331, 334 (1878); Stuhl v. Great Northern Ry., supra note 129, at
161, 161 N. W., at 502; In re Hull, 163 Minn. 439, 453, 204 N. W. 534, 539
(1925) ; Indian Creek Drainage Dist. No. I -v. Garrott, 123 Miss. 301, 321,
85 So. 312, 319 (1920) ; Thompson v. Androscoggin Co., supraj note 97, at
554; Columbia Delaware Bridge Co. v. Geisse, 55 N. J. L. 558, 563 (1871);
Staten v. Norfolk & Carolina R.R., supra note 11, at 288, 16 S. E. at 184;
Hyde v. Minnesota, Dakota & Pacific Ry., supra note 138, at 235, 130 N.
W. at 98; G. C. & S. F. Ry. v. Fuller, 63 Tex. 467, 471 (1885); Lambert
v. Norfolk, supra note 129, at 259, 61 S. E. at 778; Smith v. St. Paul,
Minneapolis & M. Ry., 39 Wash. 355, 360, 81 Pac. 840, 842 (1905); 6
HALSBURY, 44, 49; 1 LEwis, 57, 444.
At other times it is stated that in eminent domain proceedings compensa-
tion will be granted for elements of loss for which no damages would be
awarded in actions between private parties. Lake Erie & Western R.R. v.
Scott, 132 Ill. 429, 436, 24 N. E. 78, 80 (1890); Der, Moines Wet Wash
Laundry v. Des Moines, 197 Ia. 1082, 1090, 198 N. W. 486, 490 (1924);
Woodbury v. Inhabitants of Beverly, 153 Mass. 245, 247, 26 N. E. 851, 852
(1891); Harmon v. Omaha, 17 Neb. 548, 550 (1885); Tidewater Ry, v.
Shartzer, 107 Va. 562, 567, 59 S. E. 407, 409 (1907) ; 2 NICHOLS, 853, 855,
176 COmmONS, LEGAL FouNDATIoNs OF CAPITALISIx (1924) 3-60 passirn,
165, 181, 184-191, 199, 211, 238, 247, 264, 274, 282, 314-320 pass im, 374;
Cook, Scientific Method and the Law (1927) 13 A. B. A. J. 303.
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72 Pac. 140, 141, 61 L. R. A. 601, 602 (1903); Matter of Hamilton Avenue,
Brooklyn, 14 Barb. 405, 411" (N. Y. Sup. 1852); Atwater v. Trustees of
Village of Canandaigua, 124 N. Y. 602, 609, 27 N. E. 385, 387 (1891);
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Lake County, 58 Utah 546, 553, 200 Pac. 510, 513 (1921).
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U. S. 149, 151, 45 Sup. Ct. 38 (1924); Associated Pipe Line Co. v. Rail-
road Commission, 176 Cal. 518, 528, 169 Pac. 62, 66 (1917) ; Tripp v. Over-
ocker, 7 Colo. 72, 74, 1 Pac. 695, 697 (1883); Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v.
Public Utilities Commission, 69 Colo. 275, 279, 193 Pac. 726, 728 (1920);
C. & W. I. R.R. v. E. C. Ry., 115 II. 375, 385, 4 N. E. 246, 249 (186);
Evansville and C. R.R. v. Dick, 9 Ind. 433, 436 (1857); Kemper v. City
of Louisville, 14 Bush (77 Ky.) 87, 90, 93 (1878); Lee v. Pembroke Iron
Co., 57 Me. 481, 484 (1867); Ashley v. Port Huron, 35 Mlich. 296, 301
(1877) ; Pearsall v. Supervisors, 74 Mich. 558, 561, 42 N. W. 77, 4 L. R. A.
193, 194 (1889); Adams v. Chicago, B. & N. R.R., 39 Mlinn. 280, 290, 39
N. W. 629, 631 (1888); Broadwell v. City of Kansas, 75 Mo. 213, 218
(1881); Prairie Pipe Line Co. v. Shipp, 305 Mo. 663, 672, 267 S. W. 647,
649 (1924); City of Omaha v. Kramer, 25 Neb. 489, 493, 41 N. W. 295,
296 (1889); Forster v. Scott, 136 N. Y. 577, 584, 32 N. E. 976, 977, 18 L.
R. A. 543, 547 (1893); Garvey v. Long Island R.R., 159 N. Y. 323, 329,
54 N. E. 57, 58 (1899); Syracuse Solar Salt Co. v. Rome, W. & 0. R. R.,
43 App. Div. 203, 209, 60 N. Y. Supp. 40, 44 (3rd Dep't. 1899), af'd, 168
N. Y. 650, 61 N. E. 1135 (1901); Rome, Watertown & 0. R.R. v. Gleason,
42 App. Div. 530, 533, 59 N. Y. Supp. 647, 649 (4th Dep't. 1889); Gordon
v. Village of Silver Creek, 127 App. Div. 888, 891, 112 N. Y. Supp. 54, 56
(4th Dep't 1908); Crawford v. Village of Delaware, 7 Ohio St. 459, 471
(1857); Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood Co., 8 Ohio St. 333, 346 (1858); City
of Mansfield v. Balliett, 65 Ohio St. 451, 471, 63 N. E. 86, 92, 58 L. R. A.
628, 635 (1902); Callen v. Columbus Edison Electric Light Co., 66 Ohio
St. 166, 175, 64 N. E. 141, 143 (1902); G. C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Fuller, 63
Tex. 467, 469 (1885); Stockdale v. Rio Grande Western Ry., 28 Utah 201,
211, 77 Pac. 849, 852 (1904); Foster v. Stafford Nat. Bank, 57 Vt. 128,
133 (1884); State v. Superior Court, 26 Wash. 278, 286, 66 Pac. 385, 388
(1901); Great Northern Ry. v. State, 102 Wash. 348, 351, 173 Pac. 40, 42
(1918); Fruth v. Board of Affairs, 75 W. Va. 456, 460, 84 S. E. 105, 100,
L. R. A. 1915C 981, 983 (1915); Goodall v. City of Milwaukee, 5 Wis. 32,
39, 46 (1856); Janesville v. Carpenter, 77 Wis. 288, 301, 46 N. W. 128, 132
(1890) ; Piper v. Ekern, 180 Wis. 586, 596, 194 N. W. 159, 162, 34 A. L. R.
32, 38 (1923).
